By UTPALA MENON and ILIAS KALOTYCHOS

It was about 6:30 pm in Bologna, with the sun finally showing signs of setting. Another long Tuesday had taken its toll on a group of tired Bolognesi.

Nonetheless, they packed the auditorium for a rare conversation presented by  the Bologna Institute of Policy Research last week.

The conversation began with a simple question from a student in the audience:  “Do you think this is the end of the Euro?” President Romano Prodi, the former Italian Prime-Minister and President of the European Commission, gave an unequivocal answer.

“No!”

After an illustrious career, Prodi has settled in Bologna, though he continues to serve as the U.N. Special Envoy for the Sahel and teaches economics at the University of Bologna where people affectionately refer to him as “Il Professore.”

On the evening of April 4, BIPR invited Mr. Prodi to engage with SAIS students in a conversation related to the future of the Eurozone. He sounded a hopeful, if overly optimistic stance on the present state of European affairs. Largely, he drew on his experience with migration from Sahel as a microcosm through which to consider the rise in populism both in Europe and across the globe. The SAIS Observer sat down with President Romano Prodi shortly before his conversation to discuss these issues in more detail.

The SAIS Observer: What is the state of the European Union, seeing as we have had the triggering of the Article 50 in the U.K. and the continuous discussion over political populism?

President Romano Prodi: The European Union in the last years has been losing strength and speed. The steps taken by the union have always been difficult. However, the differentiation of the member states had been increasing until the first breakup that was Brexit. And such a development is important because half of the world was looking through Europe with “British glasses”.

Britain has always been trying to get increasing differentiation from the EU. I am very sad for the Brexit. It was unexpected but not a surprise, if perhaps we can put it this way. Then we had Trump; for the first time, an American president puts himself openly against Europe.

Nonetheless, in my opinion it is the start of the European recovery, in the sense that Angela Merkel, who is the leader of Europe in this moment, agreed on the proposal of different speeds in Europe: multiple speeds and enhanced cooperation. “We cannot be altogether, because it is a moment that international policy mix-ups are different, but we go on forward with the countries that want to be together.” And, this is important.

TSO: During your presidency, we witnessed the further integration of countries into the European Union. Has this deeper cooperation and integration been betrayed in recent months by the apparent lack of confidence in the union?

PRP: Europe right now is not at its best. At the time [of my presidency] you had the idea of integration that was important, but now you have this strange unsettlement between Russia and the US — that I hope will change — that influences the countries. To this international phenomenon, the reaction cannot be the same for all countries. The reaction of the Baltic states is not going to be the same as the reaction of Italy. But in regards to a further disintegration process, I do not believe that Brexit will be an example for more countries to follow.

TSO: You have played a big role in incentivizing the EU in regards of the Sahel countries. Could the EU help the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean countries?

PRP: The south Mediterranean countries were regretting that my attention was only to the North and Northeast and this was my biggest nightmare. My answer was honest and in good faith: ‘look, this is a historical necessity, the empty space from the fall of the Soviet Union obliges us to act immediately’.

Most of my personal proposals in favor of a systemic policy to the South were met with the denial of Northwestern European countries, claiming that initiatives towards the South would have been money wasted. I am convinced that we have an obligation to both the Sahel countries but also with the countries struggling with immigration at the moment.

Considering Sahel in particular, we need to have a systemic plan for development and cooperation, because the reasons for immigration are irresistible. In addition to that, the biggest countries in Europe, population-wise, are facing significant problems with their birth rates. The rate is close to 1.39 births per person in Europe, while in Sahel it is much higher. The people in the Sahel countries are facing vast problems, so they are trying to find a way out.

An additional problem is the Libyan war, which makes migration unpredictable and less manageable. Even if the war were to stop tomorrow, the problem would still exist. Europe is afraid of the domestic political aspect of migration, and it is seen only in a national perspective.

TSO: Can the Europe hope for further cooperation to combat the challenges?

PRP: If you ask me whether all the European countries are willing to do that then I would answer no. But I believe a partial agreement among countries and a partial plan on immigration can be placed forward.

TSO: Can the European Union look to China in order to further relations that would help its economic situation?

PRP: It all depends on the American policy. If Trump implements the policies he claims, then the EU is obliged to look to different outlets for economic cooperation, such as China, India or Africa. In terms of quantity, China is the most feasible alternative. Already the trade between Europe and China is increasing more than the Atlantic one. I honestly cannot think that the American policy will follow the declaration.

But in any case, the new paths for trade will not be created by new trade agreements. The era of TPP, TTIP, NAFTA, EFTA is over. The new agreements will come through bilateral agreements. You saw how difficult the agreement between Europe and Canada was. The agreements will be on limited and targeted economic policies.

TSO: Given the G7 talks, will these talks about trade and cooperation be brought up to the discussion?

PRP: Having participated in ten G7s, I can say that nowadays the influence of the institution is withering. It is no longer, as you know, a G8 summit. The world is changing, and the G20 is more important than the G7 or G8. So no, I don’t think that the G7 will make decisions. Perhaps, it could show orientations, or a clearer American view, but I do not believe that any kind of formal decision will be taken.

TSO: Could we see, in regards to seeking alternatives as you mentioned, Europe reengaging with Russia in the near future?

PRP: There is a strange event in the last weeks: an increasing distance between Russia and Europe. It had never happened in the past that the Russian President would meet with such disruptive leaders as Le Pen or the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the leader of the Northern League. If you take the latest events together as a whole, you have a Europe that is unsettled from East to West and does not have a sense of togetherness. Again, I was absolutely shocked by the fact that the leader of the populist parties was so warmly received in the Kremlin, because in Russia these kinds of initiatives are not random in nature. They have their own political meaning. It was a signal from Russia that perhaps “we can damage you more than you can damage us with the sanctions”. It is a sign that Russia wants to go in the interior policy of Europe. Putin is a rational player in terms of foreign policy.

TSO: As a last note, are you optimistic about the future of the Euro and the European Union?

PRP: I think that there will be no other disruption, in regards to any other country wishing to leave [the union]. Optimistic is a strong word for the Euro; I‘ll simply telling you that the elections in France and Germany will help Europe. We never had, in France, a candidate with such a strong European platform, such as Macron.

In Germany, the increase in strength of the Social Democratic Party has shown that the two traditional parties in Germany, which clearly have a European agenda, are stronger than they were a few months ago. I do believe that this year will be a year of non-decision due to the elections in both countries. We could also see some enhanced cooperation in Europe, but it would be difficult to see it as a Europe of solidarity. Europe has changed, with Germany having a greater influence in the EU, while on the other hand there isn’t a supranational body that can leverage the power of the nations, like the European Commission was in the past.

The European Council dominates Europe and in the Council, of course, the stronger states have greater influence. If you take the Greek case, for example, it wasn’t a negotiation between Athens and Brussels, but a decision between Berlin and Athens, to delay the final decision due to the North Rhine-Westphalia elections.

This is not the paradigm of a traditional Europe. It was the concept of a decreasing power for us in Europe. After Great Britain decided to hold a referendum to leave the European Union, the only “umbrella” that was left open was Berlin. So, the balance between the European powers became uneven due to this change. With enhanced cooperation, perhaps we could move forward from this problematic situation. For example, in the case of defense cooperation among European states, France could play a vital role, as it is the only country with nuclear capability and a veto right.

Brexit changed the internal balance of Europe.

Utpala is a staff writer for the SAIS Observer. She is an MA student concentrating in International Law and Organizations at SAIS Bologna.

Ilias is also a staff writer for the SAIS Observer. He is an MA student concentrating in Conflict Management at SAIS Bologna. You can find him on Twitter at @IliasKalotychos.

By DAVID ELLWOOD

You only have to spend a few minutes in the streets of Bologna to see that food around here is serious business.

The city has always had a foodie air about its image, and since the financial crisis, the opportunities for eating out have multiplied like mushrooms after rain. As a form of comfort and consolation, food has always been a great unifying resource for this city – and for Italy in general – in good times and bad.

A recent conference at Nomisma, a leading economic think-tank based in Bologna, revealed just how big the stakes are in the production and marketing of food in Italy. Diplomats, businesspeople and experts described the effort that the country’s food brands and key ministries are investing in building influence and fortunes in the world’s wine and food markets.

This year, the sector brought €37 billion into the economy. A new, integrated public-private drive presented at the conference hopes to lift this figure to $50 billion by 2020. Food and wine exports have grown 69 percent over the last ten years. Here in Bologna, a giant new food fair will feature 50 food producers, 25 restaurants and countless events for enlightenment and entertainment of the edible sort.

The Nomisma meeting came right after the ‘World Wide Week of Italian Cuisine’. Italian embassies and consulates in 105 countries around the world organised over 1300 food-oriented events: tasting sessions, presentations from celebrity chefs, cooking shows and mini-courses, fairs, films, exhibitions and so on.

This crusade was one of the many spin-offs from the Expo World Fair of Milan, in 2015, dedicated to the theme of ‘Feeding the planet, energy for life!’ Over six months, more than 20 million visitors explored 150 national and company pavilions, giving a much-needed boost to the self-confidence of both the city and the country.

The success of this venture prompted a qualitative leap forward in the attention that authorities at every level give to food and wine not only as a key currency of business, but also as the sort of export which advertises the nation’s creativity, territories and values: an identity narrative that expresses the synthesis of tradition and modernity.  

Alongside a distinguished functionary of the Foreign Ministry at the Nomisma meeting, the CEO of Eataly – the global food business founded in 2004 and now worth €400 million – insisted that quality and culture were key to the success of Italy’s gastronomic brands around the world, independent of price. Good, healthy food should be available to those spending  €10 just as it is to those spending €100. On that note, French diplomats present at the meeting acknowledged that popular Italian foods like pizza and pasta are economical assets which French traditions – all revolving round haut cuisine – could not match.

The Nomisma organisers explicitly applied the label of “soft power” to what they think the new activism on food and wine means for Italy’s world presence.

The standard definition of soft power presents it as tool for leveraging a nation’s cultural and moral assets so that they might serve conventional objectives of foreign policy. However, the notion can only be taken seriously if it is seen as an expression of prestige and leadership in areas that rarely, if ever, have anything to do with geopolitics.

Food is an example of an issue that broadens the scope of foreign policy. Producing and selling food in a global market connects agriculture and the environment, health and education. Matters of trade, investment and regulation are involved.

Furthermore, every nation with a unique gastro-heritage expects to see it on display around the globe.

A nation can only become a serious player in the game of soft power when it tells stories that others can admire and trust, or sets standards which others choose to follow.

France, with its Michelin stars for the finest restaurants in the world, provides a classic example of an established soft power asset. As such, they were often quoted in the Nomisma gathering.

However, today’s demotic food culture – with its celebrity chefs, vast T.V. audiences, countless cookbooks and new restaurants on every block – demands eating experiences that are authentic and accessible, yet evoke exotic places and traditions. In this soft power competition, Italy looks like it will be a clear winner.

David Ellwood is a faculty guest writer for the SAIS Observer. He teaches Soft Power at SAIS Europe.

by CHELSEA TOCZAUER

NANJING – U.S. Ambassador to China, Max Baucus, visited the Hopkins-Nanjing Center on Thursday, October 13, 2016. Before President Barack Obama nominated Baucus for Ambassador to China in January 2014, Baucus served as the longest Senator for Montana in U.S. history. During his tenure as senator, Amb. Baucus served on several committees including finance, taxation, deficit reduction, foresting and infrastructure. He also helped the United States push through Free Trade Agreements with several countries, permanently establish a relationship with China in 2000 and actively support China’s entrance to the World Trade Organization in 2001. During his time visiting the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Amb. Baucus shared a dinner with current students before giving a speech to the student body.

Kathryn Miles, a second-year Master’s student at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center says, “I really appreciated the opportunity to eat with the ambassador, Consul General, HNC administrators and students. The ambassador was eager to answer students’ questions and was very optimistic about the future of the U.S.-China relations, and he stressed the importance of working together to resolve differences. He spoke fondly about his travels throughout different parts of China, and at the end of dinner the ambassador showed that he was in touch with Chinese culture — we started a WeChat group and everyone at the dinner joined! I think a lot of my fellow students and I hope to have a career in influencing U.S.-China relations in the future, so this chance to meet the ambassador and ask questions about his experiences was a fantastic and rare opportunity.”

Beginning his speech, Amb. Baucus commented how impressed he was with the quality of students at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center after meeting and conversing with several students over dinner. He then highlighted the importance of the U.S.-China relationship in world affairs, stating that, “all of us are privileged to be here at this moment in time and history, and as such an obligation has been given to us to not just think, but to act. A lot of life is action. And, sometimes, this may involve taking risks,” he reflected.

Amb. Baucus reflected on taking a risk as an undergraduate student by staying overseas for a year from 1962 to 1963 hitchhiking around the world with just a knapsack, a sewing kit, and the shirt on his back. During that time, he remembers meeting the terrific people and seeing the most wonderful things. While staying at the YMCA in New Delhi, a man told him that if you call up the Prime Minister of India on Thursdays, he regularly meets with foreigners. Amb. Baucus was only 21 years old at the time, but decided to see if it was true, called, and got an appointment to meet Prime Minister Nehru! Though their half hour was spent making small talk, the meeting left a big impression on Amb. Baucus. After their meeting ended, Amb. Baucus watched Prime Minister Nehru as he spoke and met with several dozen Indians from Bangalore, India. It was not until in the Belgian Congo, however, that he realized his calling was public service. The world was developing and getting smaller. It is our job to protect things and make them better. Even if you make mistakes, Amb. Baucus maintains that this is good; you are doing something and your next choice will be a better one after learning from experience.

Amb. Baucus commented that rising China is an exciting country to be in because of its “pragmatic, energetic and practical” people. He is always struck by how much China has progressed from the Open-Door policies initiated in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping. “I try at my job to encourage as many exchanges as possible in China,” Amb. Baucus says. Besides supporting all kinds of exchanges from environmental protection to healthcare programs, he also encourages as many congressional representatives as possible to come over and visit China. However, he is disappointed that more American students do not come to China to study. He believes it is critical for students to learn here given the increasing need and responsibility for both countries to cooperate on global issues.

Amb. Baucus now questions whether China and America will be able to cooperate for both countries’ mutual benefit. Amb. Baucus holds that “a lot in life is not inevitable; a lot in life is what we do with it… [Therefore, we] have no choice but to try our best.” He wants to remind students how lucky we are to live in this time; he believes we have not only the ability, but the obligation given that ability, to serve in a way that facilitates the positive progression of our countries’ and societies’ relationships as stewards to the planet. It is important for both Chinese and foreign students to take advantage of our time studying and working together. The main takeaway, he says, is that “we are here for a speck of time…[and with this] incredible opportunity an obligation has been given to us; when we leave this place [we must] leave it in as good of shape or better than we found it.”

BY LISA MARTINE JENKINS & RAPHAËL BOUSQUET

In this United States election cycle, the issue of Iran has loomed large. The Iran nuclear treaty in particular has figured prominently into the two candidates’ sparring over foreign policy, with Hillary Clinton generally defending the treaty and Donald Trump pledging to tear it up upon arriving in the Oval Office.

However, to what extent does this focus actually reflect the country’s knowledge on the subject? What influence does this treaty, which represents a relatively distant and obscure set of international weapon and energy interests, have on American foreign policy, both during the election and after?

In order to begin to answer some of these questions, the SAIS Observer consulted SAIS Europe visiting professor Gary Sick, who is teaching a mini-course entitled “United States in the Persian Gulf: From Outlier to Empire.” When not in Bologna, Professor Sick is a senior research scholar at Columbia’s Middle East Institute and an adjunct professor at the School of International and Public Affairs. He has served on the National Security Council as a White House aide for Iran and as a U.S. Navy captain.

We sat down with Professor Sick last week to take a look at the role of the Iran Nuclear Treaty in the context of the U.S. election and its potential impact on foreign policy going forward.

The SAIS Observer: Generally, what is your opinion on the Iran Nuclear Treaty?

Gary Sick: The key thing that made it all possible was that the United States said, in those secret negotiations, that we were prepared to accept the fact that Iran would have a full nuclear fuel cycle, that they would have the right to actually produce their own nuclear fuel. And from Iran’s point of view, that was critical. That’s what broke down the talks previously – the U.S. said even one centrifuge turning was one too many. That perspective was a mistake in my view but that’s where we were.

The Obama administration decided that Iran’s potential nuclear fuel cycle would be acceptable and so that broke the ice. I think they thought the talks would be easy, but it turned out to be a lot harder than they thought. It became extremely technical and, from a diplomatic and technical point of view, the U.S. really deserves a lot of credit.

They were playing four-dimensional chess: they had to worry about the objectives of Iran, the UN Security Council, the U.S. Congress and even the American people. And so the bottom line is that they cut a deal that is extremely complex, but I think is the best deal anyone could have possibly hoped for. The reasons it’s now under attack are basically political.

TSO:  So, how has this complex treaty become such a politicized part of the election today? Does anyone even know what they’re arguing about?

GS:  The Republicans made the treaty a politicized issue in the run-up to the agreement. They basically criticized it as intensively as they possibly could. Trump has run with those arguments, but they would still be a part of the conversation if Ted Cruz or Marco Rubio or even Jeb Bush were the nominee. It became a Republican issue basically because it came from Obama, and that’s all it takes to say they’re against it. Also, the treaty was strongly opposed by Netanyahu and Israel. And when you put the Republicans together with the Israeli lobby, which is very significant in the U.S., it means that they’re just absolutely committed to opposing this.

I’ve actually seen something like this before with regard to the Executive Agreement that the U.S. had with Iran after the hostage crisis [from 1979-1981]. That was highly unpopular with Ronald Reagan, who was running for president at that time. The agreement was actually negotiated in the interim period between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

So if Hillary Clinton is elected, I think [the terms of the treaty will definitely be upheld]. With Trump, it’s impossible to predict. However, if he’s doing his job, he would have to come to the conclusion that the only thing to gain by doing away with this is to show bad faith not just to the Iranians, but also to all of the other states who negotiated this with us and whose signatures are on it. So he would be starting his presidency by saying to the world, “you cannot trust the U.S.” How we would gain anything from that, I have no idea.

TSO: While we witness a breakthrough in U.S.-Iran relations under Obama, the Iran deal strained U.S.-Israeli relations. Under the Obama administration, no progress was made in terms of Israel-Palestine peace settlement. Is it possible to advance on these two goals or are they mutually exclusive?

GS: I don’t think these two goals are mutually exclusive. John Kerry was actually very active on both files and tried very hard to negotiate a peace settlement on the Israel-Palestine issue while the Iran deal was in the making.

The two issues are linked. Israel has been using the Iran threat for years in order to deflect attention from the Palestinian issue. While the deal – by halting the advance of nuclear Iran – is ultimately beneficial to Israel’s security, it takes the argument away from Netanyahu that Iran should be seen as an existential threat. Since Netanyahu’s political platform is to be tough on security, it’s natural he opposed the deal.

Israeli politics does influence U.S. politics though, notably through political and financial pressure in Washington. Israel’s strongly-voiced opposition, which culminated in Netanyahu’s visit to the U.S. Congress in March 2015, emboldened Republican opposition to the deal.

TSO: The Iran deal could be seen as a landmark that would usher a new period in the U.S.-Iran relationship. Yet, this policy of ‘opening’ is coming under pressure in both Iran and the U.S. Will this policy survive after the Obama administration?

GS: The deal was a technical agreement on a security issue: it was about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. That’s all it was about and that’s all it was intended to be about.

However, it did open up a channel – which meant there was the possibility to settle old disputes. American journalists held in Iran were freed and the U.S. repaid one outstanding debt to Iran (which had been contracted after the fall of the Shah when the U.S. stopped shipping military equipment that Iran had paid for). The opening up of communication meant both issues became ripe and were settled at the same time.

The deal does not mean that the U.S.and Iran are going to be best friends, but it symbolizes a breakthrough in U.S.-Iran relations. For the first time in forty years, the two countries are now able to talk to each other. Kerry and Zarif have developed a very business-like relationship and have set up a direct channel of communication which can be useful.

It is not clear whether this channel – based on a personal relationship – will translate in the next administration. In the event that Hillary Clinton gets elected, Kerry will not be Secretary of State. However, there are other people who could step in to maintain the U.S.’s channel of communication with Iran, like perhaps [former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State] Bill Burns. It will depend on whether Hillary Clinton wants to protect this relationship.

BY JONATHAN HALL-EASTMAN

Hua Tao earned his Ph.D. in History from Nanjing University’s Department of History in 1989. He currently serves as a professor of Chinese Studies at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center and professor and doctoral advisor at Nanjing University. From 1992-1993, he was a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute. His research interests include the history of ethnic minorities in Northwest China and the contemporary development of China’s ethnic minorities. He has taught at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center since 1994.

During your time studying China’s minorities, in what ways has your focus changed?

When I started out at Nanjing University and also during my year at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, I was a historian of northern Chinese minorities during the medieval period. I focused on the inhabitants of Northern China, the Mongolian steppe, Central Asia, as well as on the interaction of these regions with agricultural areas to the south and the process of Islamization that took place throughout the Central Asia and Northwest China. However, the HNC is focused on modern issues, so when I started teaching here, I shifted my academic focus to the present day. This turned out to be an excellent opportunity for me to become more informed about the present condition of ethnic minorities in Chinese society.

You spent a lot of time working on a “civilization dialogue” between the Chinese and the Islamic civilizations. What spurred your interest in this subject and how did you go about this work?

Just like outside China, the September 11th attacks sparked a lot of interest within China in studying Islam. Chinese people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, wanted to understand the meaning of the attacks. Many people were interested in Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory as an explanation of what had happened. Much of my previous research had involved studying the history of Muslims in China, so this topic tied into my own work. Just at that time, Tu Weiming, Harvard professor and the then-director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, introduced me to his dialogue with the Islamic civilization. He is a leading Chinese-American scholar of Confucianism and did some dialogue with Muslim scholars around the world and in the United States, for example, Hossein Nasr, a famous Muslim scholar who is the father of Vali Nasr, the current dean of SAIS. Therefore, I worked with Professor Tu since 2001 in the dialogue between the Chinese and Islamic civilizations in China. Many Chinese Hui Muslim scholars joined us. Through the dialogue we reached a common understanding of the history of Islam in China and its relations with the Chinese civilization. The Hui people in China, for example, use Confucian terms and concepts to describe their Islamic beliefs.

The Hui are distinctive as a Chinese minority group that seems to be defined by religion and not ethnicity. How did this come about?

The history of the Hui in China is quite interesting. There have been Muslims in China since the Tang Dynasty, but the biggest period of immigration was during the Mongol Yuan period. During and after their conquest of China, the Mongols brought along with them a large numbers of Arab and Persian Muslims as soldiers, traders, government officials and so on from West and Central Asia where they conquered earlier. Over time, these Muslims intermarried with local Chinese to the point where they became indistinguishable from Han Chinese, but they preserved their religion and some cultural character up to the present day. This heritage means that they are quite dispersed throughout the country when compared to most other minorities, though they are most concentrated in Northwest China.

Some scholars of Islam in China have talked about a process of “re-Islamization” where the Hui people have become more strongly attached to their religion in recent years. What factors are contributing to this trend?

During the early stages of the People’s Republic of China and even more during the Cultural Revolution, religious designations were seen as being unimportant compared to class distinctions — you were a landlord, a farmer, an intellectual and so on, rather than a member of a specific religious or ethnic group. Strong religious belief was frowned upon. However, after the Cultural Revolution ended, the Hui people gradually began to pay more and more attention to their Islamic beliefs. They made pilgrimages to Mecca, participated in foreign trade with Arab countries and other Muslim countries and sought to better understand Islamic scholarship.

How is Islam seen in Chinese society?

The majority Han Chinese population does not have a very clear idea of the history and customs of Islam. Just like in many other countries, many people form their impressions of Islam as a religion based on what they hear in the international news media.

For students or individuals interested in learning about China’s ethnic minorities outside the classroom, what sorts of means are available?

It’s quite difficult, because most foreigners living in China reside in big eastern cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing that are overwhelmingly Han Chinese. Even when they live further to the west, they will not see or interact with that many minorities in the big cities. Two years ago, thanks to generous support from Johns Hopkins, Professor Simon, my American colleague at HNC, and I organized an academic visit of our HNC students to Muslim areas in Ningxia province. We visited mosques, madrassas, and interacted extensively with the local people in the area. It was an excellent experience for everyone involved. I believe, with the support of Nanjing University and JHU, our students will have more chances in the future.

BY SHAWN DOYLE

Donald Trump is careening towards the Republican nomination, with the conservative establishment left watching in horror as the failed meat salesman and former reality television star hijacks the party. A last-ditch movement to stop Trump before the convention has materialized to prevent this reality. The SAIS community has played a significant role in these efforts, as Strategic Studies program director Eliot Cohen helped organize an open letter for this purpose. Signed by a diverse set of leaders from throughout the Republican foreign policy spectrum, the letter remains a key moment of dissent crystallized within the campaign.

We sat down with Dr. Cohen to discuss the letter, the public reaction to it, and what the broader significance of Trump’s rise might be.

Can you describe the the process of how the letter came together?

It originated the way things often do. I was emailing a bunch of friends including the letter’s co-writer Bryan McGrath. A bunch of friends, all identifying as conservatives, and we all were profoundly alarmed by Trump. Not only on foreign policy grounds but on domestic policy grounds as well. Someone said that there should be some kind of letter. McGrath, an enterprising guy and former destroyer skipper, decided to go ahead and write the letter with me. It was very much a last minute thing. We emailed 50 or 60 people, just going through our rolodexes and off the top of our heads. About 50 people immediately signed…We got 70 more and actually just decided to cap it now.

That you find Trump exceptionally disagreeable is well known. Were there any broader motivations in this effort?

Different people have different motivations. For me, I have grandchildren. I have this image of my four-year-old granddaughter asking me, “Grandpa, what did you do when Donald Trump was running for president?” on a spring break 15 years from now. I wanted to have a good answer. We did not hold any illusions that this would sway a single vote. I think the people who signed it felt that it was very important to put their thoughts on the record.

What do you think a potential Trump presidency means for American foreign policy and power?

There have always been populist and neo-isolationist wings in both parties. Trump is a particularly repellent manifestation of it on the Republican side, but it’s there within both parties. For a variety of reasons, those wings of both parties have gotten stronger over the past 15 years. It’s now more important than ever to reaffirm the basic bipartisan foreign policy consensus that we have had since World War II. What I am fearful of is that we are going to go through a number of years of turmoil. In the old days that would have been okay since we did not have a larger role to play in sustaining world order. But now we do. A lot of bad things can happen in the world if we have four or eight years of the United States being out of the game because we’re engaged in our own internal politics.

In your mind, as this process unfolds, what is the future for the Republican party and for the American political system as a whole?

My own view is that if Trump is the nominee, it really tarnishes the Republican brand. Not just him, but all the officials who will line up behind him. That is, to my mind and to others, unacceptable. There have been deep divisions brewing within the Republican party for quite some time, over things like taxes—things that became litmus test issues which never should have. Issues such as the Second Amendment. These splits are coming to the surface, and I could definitely see a third party is emerging. The [political] rules could change, could get blown up. We could see the same sort of changes amongst the Democrats as well, as they have moved towards the left.

If there is a third party, even though I am not a libertarian at all, I would like to see it have a basically libertarian attitude on social issues. I think you can come up with things that fit the temper of the times. I don’t see why you can’t have two parties, three, four. I don’t think anyone really knows. I think we’re in uncharted territory.

Dr. Cohen’s letter, “Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders,” can be found at warontherocks.com.