By: Alexandra Huggins

Edited By: Edu Kenedi

European strategic autonomy has been central in transatlantic discourse as of late, particularly in light of a non-committal United States for long term assurances and the ever prevalent threat of Russia. The countries of the EU have reached a watershed moment where greater autonomy in defense is necessary to ensure their own security. Yet, with a lack of cohesion amongst member states and pressing questions about the role of NATO and the United States, autonomy needs to take the form of further infrastructure development that is complementary to, but neither reliant on or dismissive of, NATO and US military structures. To solidify EU security in the long run, its defense infrastructure needs to be strengthened through the cooperation and development of individual member states, so that security in Europe is multidimensional and not reliant on any one actor. Such development needs to be supported through the cooperation of NATO, the EU, and the US, utilizing the strengths of each actor to minimize the weaknesses, or unreliability, of the others.

The concept of European strategic autonomy is an idea that has been necessarily invigorated by the first major territorial threat to Europe since World War II with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. While exact definitions and interpretations of the term vary, the common factor is the desire of many actors in the European community to lessen their collective reliance on external actors for their security, both economic and military, and increase their own self sufficiency. In terms of military security, the heavy involvement of the United States in European security is a primary concern, as the security guarantee that the US provides through NATO, as well as the size of its military budget, has been a key consideration in the threat Russia poses in Ukraine and to the rest of Europe. 

The security threat that Russia poses to Europe cannot be understated. Aside from the norm-breaking aggression and violation of sovereignty in Ukraine and Crimea, NATO leaders have warned about the likelihood of Russia expanding its campaign to other bordering countries should they be successful in Ukraine. Europe as a whole has largely recognized Russia’s aggression as a blatant breach of international law and a concern for all European states. The immediate response to the invasion demonstrated a remarkable cohesion and urgency not characteristic of the EU in the past, an effort supplemented and matched by the United States and NATO in both policy efforts, including sanctions, and aid. However, as the war has continued and other international crises draw the world’s attention, the unity surrounding the EU’s stance on Ukraine has weakened. Countries in closer proximity to Russia and Ukraine in the North and East remain concerned for their own national security. In Southern and Western Europe, concerns center more around the economic impact of the war affecting inflation and energy prices as the second winter since the beginning of the war approaches. However, despite the differing perspective on the primary area of concern, the continued Russian aggression poses an ongoing, ever-prevalent threat to Europe as a whole, be it in the economic or security sector. A significant development in the dialogue surrounding European strategic autonomy was the Versailles Declaration in March of 2022, which laid out, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, plans for furthering strategic autonomy, including increasing defense capabilities, stimulating cooperation between member states, and the establishment of an economic base that reduced dependencies on other energy sources, namely Russia natural gas, coal, and oil. However, Europe still lacks the cohesion and consensus required to accomplish these goals and with the role of external actors undetermined, the bridge between these stated goals and their realization has not been built.

The primary issue to address in achieving greater European strategic autonomy is the lack of cohesion amongst the European states, surrounding both the definition of what the realization of this concept would look like, as well as opinions on the advisability of its pursuit. France, as well as the EU itself, has historically been the biggest advocate, with the remainder of the states falling between the stalwart “Atlanticists,” those who seek strong US involvement in European security, to “Europeanists,” or those who seek a more strategically independent Europe . Particularly, there is skepticism surrounding the concept in Central and Eastern Europe, where states, who are arguably most at risk of further aggression should Russia expand its campaign, seek a strong US presence to ensure European security. Despite the prior agreement established in March 2022, the consensus on these goals among member states is far from reached. Therefore, it is necessary for the EU and its member states to come to a consensus on the direction of European strategic autonomy going forward, which, by necessity, predates the actionable realization of any policies. 

A related issue is the reluctance of many states to commit to the idea of such a Europe, with roadblocks such as smaller states within the EU raising concerns that a strategically autonomous Europe will limit their own options while strengthening the regional power of larger countries, like Germany and France. Other concerns center around the idea that strengthened EU security capabilities will threaten and infringe on those of NATO with the resources and budgets of individual countries split between the two initiatives. 

Outside of the lack of unity amongst the member states, the continued role and relationship of the United States with Europe remains a question that will likely only be answerable following the results of the 2024 presidential elections. President Biden will likely be the most pro-European president in contemporary American politics. Should he win a second term, the EU will, at least in the short term, be able to continue their current mutually beneficial relationship with the United States in providing support to Ukraine. Should a Republican administration take office, the relationship between the United States and Europe will likely deteriorate, particularly as President Trump, whose pro-Russia stance is of great concern to the United States’ European allies, would likely freeze any further aid to Ukraine. However, the presidency is not the only concern. Republicans in Congress are becoming increasingly reluctant to provide more aid to Ukraine, and both public and congressional focus is split between Ukraine and the Gaza crisis. In any case, Europe needs to look beyond the United States, the only question is the urgency in timeline. The security guarantee that the United States has historically provided to Europe is likely on shaky ground, and Europe must look inward to guarantee its own long-term security. However, the strategic autonomy of Europe should not come at the expense of the transatlantic relationship, which will- and should- remain the primary security partnership of both the US and Europe in light of the continued Russian threat.