The “pay-for-slay” program refers to the system managed by both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that is responsible for providing financial incentives to convicted terrorists and their families, allocating millions annually to support imprisoned and released terrorists, as well as the families of “martyrs.” Enshrined in PA laws (Laws No. 14 & 19 of 2004, Law No. 1 of 2013), the program grants them monthly salaries based on the length of their sentence, with higher payments for those serving longer terms and bonuses for Arab-Israeli and Jerusalem-based terrorists. Upon release, these individuals are guaranteed employment in PA institutions, with their job rank and salary determined by time spent in prison. Families of deceased terrorists also receive monthly stipends, increasing based on the severity of the attack and the number of casualties inflicted. Between 2013 and 2023, the PA allocated approximately 8.06 billion shekels (2.12 billion dollars) to payments under “pay-for-slay.”
In 2016, Taylor Force was stabbed and killed by a Palestinian terrorist on a seaside boardwalk during a study trip to Israel sponsored by Vanderbilt University’s MBA program. He was an Eagle Scout and a West Point graduate who served in the Army with distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan. The terrorist, Bashar Masalha, was shot and killed by police. Fatah praised him as a “hero and a martyr.” He was also given a hero’s funeral, and thousands attended. Under “pay-for-slay,” his relatives began receiving monthly payments.
Two years later, in 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Taylor Force Act into law after his family spent years lobbying Congress to act. The bill aimed at restricting U.S. financial assistance to the PA until it ceases payments to individuals convicted of terrorism and families of deceased terrorists. U.S. aid will only be restored if the U.S. Secretary of State certifies that the PA has ended such payments, revoked laws authorizing them, and actively works to prevent terrorism.
Following the Hamas-led October 7 attack, payments under “pay-for-slay” in 2024 were expected to rise. While the 2024 report from the Israeli Ministry of Defense has yet to be published, the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA) assesses that restrictions on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which facilitates the payments, were likely to limit the actual disbursement of funds.
On January 23, the Washington Free Beacon reported that Republican lawmakers had reintroduced the PLO and PA Terror Payments Accountability Act, a bill aimed at imposing sanctions on the PA and the PLO for their continued operation of “pay-for-slay.” According to Senator Tom Cotton (R-RA), sanctions would apply to individuals administering these payments, entities supporting them, and financial institutions processing related transactions.
Palestinian Media Watch reported that the PA has paid over ₪506 million shekels ($133 million dollars) to 734 terrorists who are going to be released as part of the Hostage and Ceasefire Agreement reached between Israel and Hamas on January 15. Of those released, 316 have become millionaires, including Fatah terrorist Muhammad Al-Tous, who has received over ₪2.25 million shekels ($593 million dollars) since his arrest in 1985 for murder and perpetrating acts of terror.
On February 10, the Jewish Insider reported that the U.S. Supreme Court had set a date to hear arguments for two consolidated cases, Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization and United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization. The two court cases would determine whether American victims of Palestinian terror attacks can sue the PLO and PA for damages.
On the same day, Barak Ravid of Axios posted on X (formerly known as Twitter) the breaking news that PA President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree revoking “pay-for-slay” and transferring the program from the Ministry of Social Development to the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment. According to WAFA, all those who previously benefited from “pay-for-slay” would be subject to the same uniform standards applied to all families needing social welfare. An unnamed senior Palestinian official told Axios that the PA was prepared to issue the decree towards the end of U.S. President Joe Biden’s term but waited until U.S. President Donald Trump took office “to give a win to the new administration.” However, Ravid and Axios’ reporting failed to mention an essential factor in the revocation. The Jewish News Syndicate reported that, in return for issuing the decree, Abbas demanded the repeal of the Taylor Force Act, the removal of other U.S. sanctions, and the end of Israel’s deductions of tax revenue equal to the payments made by the PA. There have been no developments in either of these demands.
Many have responded negatively to the news. Both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas condemned the decision. Qadura Fares, Director of the PLO Commission of Prisoners’ Affairs, was fired from his post after questioning how the PA could demand “popular resistance” from the people and then abandon them afterward. Hilmi al-Araj, head of the Center for the Defense of Liberties and Civil Rights (Hurryyat), condemned “its timing and its content.” Oren Marmorstein, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, posted on X that it was a “new deception scheme.”
Others have responded with a lack of certainty. Analysts have expressed skepticism, viewing the move as a political maneuver rather than a genuine policy shift. Democratic and Republican members of Congress have also voiced doubtfulness, with the consensus being that the move should be met with caution. Sander Gerber, the principal architect of the Taylor Force Act, acknowledged it as a step in the right direction but remained doubtful about its sincerity.
Few have taken the news as an opportunity to assist the PA in rehabilitating its image while demonizing the State of Israel for daring to call it out. Muhammad Shehada, a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Middle East and North Africa program, posted a thread on X attempting to reframe “pay-for-slay” as a humanitarian effort while dismissing it as an “Israeli trope.” His arguments collapse under its weight: if the payments were genuinely humanitarian, why would their cessation be seen as dishonoring the “sacrifices” of those killed or imprisoned?
After two days of silence, a U.S. State Department spokesperson told The Times of Israel that the Trump-Vance Administration welcomed the decree, calling it “a positive step and a big win for the administration.” The U.S. also emphasized its commitment to “monitor how the law is implemented” and “will verify that the practice has ended.”
Recent actions have caused suspicions to grow rather than loosen up. Mahmoud Al-Habbash, Abbas’ Advisor on Religious Affairs and Islamic Relations, stated that Abbas’ decree ensured that payments to terrorists and their families would continue. Mounir Al-Jaghoub, Head of the Fatah Mobilization and Organization Commission’s Information Office, said the payments will be sent through another body. Social Development Minister Ahmad Majdalani, who has a history of being involved with acts of international terror as the leader of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), was appointed to oversee the foundation. Channel 14 reported that the PA was also sending payments to families of Hamas terrorists who were killed on October 7.
Considering all of this, the million-dollar question is: Did the Palestinian Authority stop implementing “pay-for-slay”? The answer is that on a technical level, they have not, as Abbas did not explicitly declare those who used to receive payments under “pay-for-slay” ineligible for social welfare. There is a possibility that this is nothing more than a public relations ploy to be in better standing with the Trump-Vance Administration. Still, we cannot overrule this being a genuine act towards reform within the PA. We will know by March when the subsequent payments will be made. Until then, the United States, Israel, and the Western World must wait to see if it is no longer “business as usual” within the decaying governance structure of the Palestinian Authority.
Edited By: Eric Omorogieva