How a quiet announcement at the UN could reshape global trade policy

On Tuesday, Sept. 23, Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that “as a responsible major developing country, China will not seek new special and differential treatment in current and future negotiations in the WTO.” Is this the next major step in China’s push for power?

On Dec. 11, 2001, the People’s Republic of China became the 143rd member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The terms of China’s accession agreement are many, including equal treatment of WTO Members, expansion of open-market access, and domestic legal changes to comply with WTO regulations.

These terms were critical in allowing for China’s participation in the WTO to begin with—and have fueled controversy over the country’s compliance (or lack thereof). This controversy is worth its own discussion but shall be set aside here for the sake of exploring other facets of the Chinese role in the organization.

A controversial aspect of policy within the WTO is countries’ self-declared status as developed, developing or least-developed, which determines their right to seek “special and differential treatment” (SDT) in any WTO agreement. As defined in the Doha Declaration and WTO briefing notes, countries that receive SDT are offered grace periods for policy implementation, measures to increase trade opportunities, provisions guarding trade interests, and infrastructure development assistance.

Since its accession, China has characterized itself as a developing country, which provides the right to petition for SDT in WTO negotiations. While perhaps justifiable in 2001, this position has come under fire as China’s economy has grown.

When it joined the WTO, China’s 7% share of global GDP (PPP) was deeply overshadowed by the United States at ~20%. 24 years later, China’s 19.45% towers over the US (14.88%) and even the entire European Union (14.33%) (IMF, US/China/EU).

Domestically, Chinese GDP per capita (PPP) rose from $3,258 in 2001 to $27,105 in 2024, rising from the lower tier of global economies to above the upper middle income level, and surpassing the same metric in most developing countries (World Bank). As its economy grows, China is much harder pressed to maintain credibility in its claim of developing nation status.

At the head of China’s critics is the United States. Decades of public statements and requests for specifically delineated standards for rights to SDT have implied Chinese guilt, but never directly mentioned foul play until recently.

Frustrations on this front escalated when President Trump directly condemned Chinese exploitation of WTO rules in this memorandum. In 2018, when internal WTO mechanisms proved ineffective at changing the Chinese delineation, Washington circumvented the organization entirely, placing direct tariffs on Beijing, and the US-China trade war began in earnest.

Since Trump’s first presidential term, he has taken a staunchly isolationist stance, pulling away from many international organizations. This case is no exception; in tandem with increasingly contentious US tariff policy has come intentional obstructions to WTO function, pauses in funding to the organization and even substantive threats to withdraw entirely. While the US turns its back on the WTO, China is positioned to step up into the spotlight.

What Was Said

During the General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September, Chinese Premier Li Qiang led a “High-Level Meeting on the Global Development Initiative” attended by the leaders of Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Niger, Pakistan, Vietnam, the UN, the WTO, and ministers from 30 other countries. The meeting served as a follow-up on the Global Development Initiative (GDI) announced by Xi Jinping in 2021, one of the “Three Global Initiatives” at the heart of China’s aims on the international stage. As global tensions rise, the meeting reveals Beijing’s move to restructure global governance according to its own agenda.

The meeting was keynoted by an address from Li, during which he discussed the continued importance of the GDI in the contemporary world. He emphasized four priorities in this area:

“First, we need to foster a stable and open international environment for global development.”

A thinly veiled jab at the United States for its withdrawal from international institutions and protectionist practices — “decoupling, severing supply chains and bloc confrontation would only hurt the global economy, disrupt global order and create greater risks.” Li argues for increased respect for the “UN-centered international system,” emphasizing Chinese intent to preserve and work through the multilateral organization going forward, in contrast with Trump condemning the UN and multilateralism in his address the same day.

“Second, we need to build balanced and universally beneficial partnerships for development.”

Here, Li calls out not only the US but Western-led institutions more broadly, claiming that “certain developed countries are reluctant to fulfill their pledges of development financing.” This is clearly aimed at the failures of Western countries and institutions, which generally require borrowing countries to meet standards in human rights and democratization in order to receive development aid. In contrast, Chinese lending through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) looks past such standards.

“Third, we need to cultivate future-oriented drivers for innovation-driven development.”

China’s leadership in the technology sector is widely acknowledged. Li’s encouragement here is that the world “enhance international cooperation on scientific and technological innovation” and “remove digital and AI divides.” While likely a reference to Western opposition to Chinese technology, such as TikTok or DeepSeek, Chinese advocacy for the removal of digital divides is glaringly hypocritical — the PRC maintains the most sophisticated online firewall of any country in the world. It is clear, then, that China considers digital divides in two separate contexts: information control is permissible and necessary to national defense, but limiting the export of technology is a detriment to global development.

“Fourth, we need to promote green and low-carbon development with greater sustainability.”

China’s commitment to uphold the Paris Climate Agreement is a critical reflection on the country’s approach to global problems. Li’s emphasis comes in stark contrast with the position taken by Trump on the same day, that “[climate change is] the greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world.” This divergence between the two most powerful countries in the world is as telling as any; where one abdicates leadership with a denial of scientifically established fact, the other steps forward in defense against one of the most “major challenges facing the world.”

Li additionally reiterated the past, current, and future Chinese contributions to the GDI. These include implementing over 100 green energy projects to date, mobilizing $23 billion to support Global South development since 2021, continuing funding to the WTO “China Program,” establishing an AI+ Cooperation Initiative and, most notably, declaring that “as a responsible major developing country, China will not seek new special and differential treatment in current and future negotiations at the WTO.”

Critical to understanding the position taken by Li at the meeting is the broader context of the GDI. As originally announced by Xi Jinping and reaffirmed by Li Qiang, the initiative emphasizes six priorities: staying committed to development as a priority, a people-centered approach, benefits for all, innovation-driven development, harmony between man and nature, and results-oriented actions.

Li’s points are clearly tied to the first, third, fourth, and fifth GDI priorities, but must also be understood with consideration for the second and sixth: people-centered approach and results-oriented actions. People-to-people bond was also mentioned as a priority of the BRI; it is through fostering connectivity between populations that global integration will be manifest. China’s focus on results is a reminder that the GDI is not an idealist wish for global harmony, but rather an achievable goal for which the world can strive together.

Li’s speech at the meeting was an important reminder of China’s dual nature as a world power. On the one hand, the PRC has labeled itself a developing country, both to avoid maintaining standards established by the WTO and to frame its foreign policy as “South-South Cooperation”. Li’s statement to the general assembly on Sept. 26 indicates the continuation of this position. On the other hand, China has also declared itself to be a leader among the Global South, creating a compelling narrative: China is not some pretentious forerunner reaching back to help others catch up; rather, it is an ordinary player in the development race, intending to lead by example.

What it Means

While the step to “not seek special and differential treatment” is a significant shift in China’s approach to its role both within the WTO and in the broader international order, it is important to understand exactly what this means. Western media outlets — including AP, EuroNews, PBS, and TRTWorld — have framed the shift as China “giving up” its title or status as a developing country.

However, Li’s phrasing is very clear: “As a responsible major developing country, China will not seek new special and differential treatment in current and future negotiations at the WTO.” While the intent is to no longer seek special and differential treatment, the specifics are up in the air, and it is quite clear that China still considers itself a developing country.

The implications of this shift are numerous. In the short term, one can expect to see China take a more prominent role in shaping policy in multilateral organizations — where once the PRC used SDT as an excuse by which to put off compliance, the lack of this crutch going forward will put Beijing in a position to take a more vested interest in international policy.

Additionally, the shift in rhetoric marks a turning point in the US-China trade war: US frustration with Chinese non-compliance in the WTO drove Washington to not only criticize China’s actions, but to bypass its own regulations by placing tariffs on Beijing. Now, in light of the US condemnation of both the WTO and the UN, China is poised to supplant US leadership and take the international system in a new direction.

In the long term, the shift in China’s approach to the WTO is likely to have a significant impact. The direction of this impact is largely to be decided by the US response to the change: if tensions continue to escalate, and the US maintains its protectionist and isolationist approach to the international order, China will likely take greater control of the multilateral system. However, if the US changes course and adopts a more cooperative stance, China’s role will expand, but remain somewhat constrained. If the trend in Trump’s foreign policy continues, the latter is unlikely.

Of course, there is more to consider in this context than a single bilateral relationship. Global perceptions of China are greatly varied, but rhetorical trends throughout the world are nearly unanimous in favor of increased global cooperation. The withdrawal of a global superpower from so many trade relationships has left many countries hurting, and most share China’s advocacy for multilateralism, green development, international cooperation, and respect for global institutions.

The statements at the UN General Assembly from Brazilian President Lula, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, Indonesian President Subianto, Korean President Lee, and South African President Ramaphosa are but a few examples that it is the US, and not China, that is the outlier in international policy rhetoric. The long-term implication, then, is that as global powers draw closer together, they pull further away from the United States.

In addition to the international implications of China’s decision to forego SDT, domestic messaging and public opinion are important considerations. On 26 September, the People’s Daily, China’s state-sponsored media outlet, published this article on Li Qiang’s meeting with UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

The article mentions several key takeaways from the UN General Assembly, including the cooperative role of the UN and China in cultivating international peace and security, China’s role in protecting and advancing global development, and condemnation of “unilateralist and protectionist attacks on the global economy.” The Party’s framing is a reflection of Li’s rhetoric at the UN: China and the UN are trying their best to protect the world from the harmful actions of the United States.

Ultimately, the change in China’s approach to its role in the WTO constitutes far more than bureaucratic maneuvering: it reflects a broader shift in global influence. As the United States steps back from its leadership in multilateral institutions, it leaves a vacuum of power in the international system. The country that fills that void will determine how the international economic order rebuilds itself. Severed trade ties are waiting to be mended and supply chains demand to be re-linked — and all indications suggest that China intends to be the one to forge the new international order.

Takeaway

China’s shift in its approach to the WTO marks a turn away from its passive, non-compliant role in the international order, in favor of setting the rules of global governance itself.

Edited by: Ari Fahimi and Connor Hartigan