In September 1952, the Soviet Union updated its “sector principle,” stating that all northern oceans—from the Kara Sea in the west to the East Siberian Sea—were sovereign Soviet territories. The decree aligned with Russia’s long-standing assertion of Arctic supremacy; however, the technological advancements of the early 21st century allowed Moscow to complement the proclamation with rapid industrialization and militarization of the Russian Arctic.
Through increased shipbuilding, extensive port and cargo bay development, and specialization of its navy for ice-water operations, the Soviets transformed their northern waters into a viable route for global transit. The North Sea Route (NSR) is the culmination of centuries of intent and more than eight decades of sustained policy implementation, becoming the most viable shipping corridor in the contemporary High North.
The NSR is a 3,500-mile route connecting the Bering Strait to the mouth of the Barents Sea near the Russo-Norwegian border. It is either entirely within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or in close proximity to it, therefore subject to Russian influence. Because of its relatively straight pathways and proximity to established northern industrial hubs, the NSR is 35% to 60% shorter than currently used southern channels.
Despite Moscow’s past push for increased traffic—in 1967, the Soviets advertised icebreaking capabilities along the NSR for a fee—dense multi-year ice and harsh Arctic conditions kept global interest low. However, drastic Arctic warming and impressive Russian advancements in the region have made transit along the NSR increasingly feasible.
While it is currently possible to achieve four months of annual operations with icebreaker support, researchers project ice-free summers in the Arctic by 2050. The effectiveness of NSR transit is compounded by significant potential for resource extraction. The Arctic is laden with energy and mineral deposits.
A 2008 USGS report suggests that 22% of undiscovered oil and gas reserves are spread across three key Arctic regions: the Beaufort Sea, offshore fields near Nunavut, Canada, and northwestern Russia. On the basis of these expectations, the United States has shown sustained interest in the region.
Alaska makes the nation an Arctic state, and Washington has long considered it critical to national security and economic interests. Yet, the nation’s neglect of regional policy and its limited arsenal of icebreakers positions the United States at a disadvantage to Russian supremacy in Arctic navigation.
In December 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted a new law governing transit along the NSR. It imposes restrictions on the innocent passage of foreign warships—an essential tenet of international law. The ruling is another example of de facto Russian autonomy along the NSR.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea states that a sovereign may restrict passage only in its internal waters. Additionally, straits of global importance, such as the Panama and Suez canals, are subject to transit passage to ensure unobstructed navigation. The NSR, administered by Russia’s atomic energy agency Rosatom, has become increasingly hostile toward non-allied nations.
The Belfer Center cautions against overreacting as the law applies only to Russian internal waters. However, earlier attempts to extend jurisdiction to territorial waters and Moscow’s proclamation of the NSR as a “historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Federation, subject to a single set of rules regulating shipping in the area,” are both contradictory and concerning.
Unfortunately, expressing concern is the limit of current American capability. The NSR is secured by Russia’s Northern Fleet. Based out of the Kola Peninsula and centered around submarine nuclear strike capabilities, the fleet also operates more than 40 polar icebreakers, seven of which are nuclear-powered.
The U.S. Coast Guard currently operates three seaworthy vessels, each held back by age, design, or support limitations. It is also important to consider the disparity in ice class between Russian and American vessels. Ice class refers to a ship’s ability to cut through various densities of ice formations and is critical to its period of Arctic activity.
Contrary to American capabilities, Russian icebreakers can overwhelmingly cut through deeper formations and sustain longer operations. Therefore, despite international disapproval, Russia continues to independently govern shipments on the NSR.
This autonomy has profound implications for current and future geopolitics. Russian aggression has endured in the face of comprehensive Western sanctions. Since 2022, the war economy has been bolstered by exports of Arctic oil and natural gas. The NSR is a crucial link connecting oil fields in Yamal and Gydan to buyers in East and South Asia.
In 2024, 95% of NSR traffic consisted of deliveries to China, and Arctic energy accounted for 11% of Russian exports and 7.5% of total GDP. Russia is cognizant of its dependency on Arctic energy but rests assured given its unfettered access. In line with Soviet-era ambitions, contemporary Russian officials continue to announce hefty targets for trade along the NSR—a deviation from reality.
These deficiencies, coupled with pressure from the western front, are compelling Moscow to cut corners on maritime regulations. Herein lies another problem: the lack of institutional oversight. In the absence of international scrutiny, Rosatom has begun relaxing standards for ships plying the NSR.
Last month, the Barents Observer reported on an ill-equipped tanker, the Lynx, that was stuck for several days at the 72nd parallel north on the NSR. Prolonged, uncontrolled exposure in the High North spells disaster for any vessel, exacerbating the chances of harm to personnel, product, or the environment. An oil spill in the Arctic would be a tragedy for the future of safe navigation and a disservice to responsible Arctic governance.
Additionally, Russian authorities have allegedly tried to conceal the movement of hazardous cargo. The Lynx, alongside other members of Russia’s “shadow fleet”—the Makalu, Aquatica, and Danshui—was omitted from the official registries of the NSR administrators.
Washington routinely addresses such transgressions elsewhere in the world. The U.S. Navy ensures compliance with international conventions through its freedom of navigation operations, most notably in the South China Sea and the Middle East.
Its inability to do the same in the Arctic—because of limited capabilities and personnel readiness—underscores dire shortcomings of the United States in preserving the rules-based institutions of its own making. The heyday of Arctic competition and trade is near. Therefore, the United States must rapidly
make good on its assertions of being a bona fide Arctic nation and develop the infrastructure, alliances, and military readiness necessary to ensure an effective and sustained presence. The recent U.S.-Finnish agreement on icebreaker procurement is a welcome development, although the results of this intensive project will take a long time to materialize, making it difficult to fully ascertain its impact.
The current trajectory of policy directives in Washington will undoubtedly shape the nature of Arctic affairs, and it is in the global interest to promote a free and liberal regional order in the globalized High North.
Edited by: Krithiga Narayanan