On Oct. 25, Madagascar’s elite military unit CAPSAT (Army Corps of Personnel and Administrative and Technical Services) launched a coup after a month of violent protests against President Andry Rajoelina’s government over its perceived corruption and failure to provide basic government facilities such as running water to vast parts of the country. This is the latest in coups that have occurred across Africa since 2020, reflecting widespread discontent against government failures to improve the economic and security environment for their citizens. Militaries have often used this sentiment to justify the forcible takeover of power, promising to make wholesale changes to how governance is carried out before handing power to a democratic government. Unfortunately, the militaries have not kept up to that promise.

There were several efforts made to ensure a civilian-led transition to a democratic government after the military coup against former President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, following mass and sustained protests against the government. However, power struggles between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) meant that crucial transition milestones, such as the integration of the state’s military arms, never took place. Ultimately, these schisms resulted in direct fighting between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, with the civil war culminating in one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises in the world. 

Likewise, in the semi-arid Sahel region between the Sahara and coastal West Africa, a hotbed of  Islamist militant activity, military coups have occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since August 2020, each claiming to enhance security and promote economic growth. Instead, militant groups have made several territorial advances since the coups. At the same time, neither Mali nor Burkina Faso nor Niger has even made plans to hold elections, even as all these governments have curtailed press freedoms and crucial poverty-reduction-focused NGOs’ activities. 

All of these serve as an example of the “drifting coup.” In this phenomenon, militaries come into power promising to implement civilian transitions or at least a quick return to democracy while improving state structures to improve service delivery as well as security and economic outcomes. However, without a properly planned transition, involvement by civil society in government, and civilian oversight over military activities, the militaries of coup-affected nations often ignore their commitments and seek to perpetuate power. These militaries often issue decrees that delay elections and justify their actions by claiming that they need more time to fulfill their promises. Additionally, decrees are also passed as laws, which muzzle the press and civil society’s criticism of the military’s actions. 

The militaries also act with impunity because there are few consequences to their actions. In the post-Cold War era from 1991 to around 2020, several countries, led by the West, were willing and able to coordinate punitive measures against militaries that launched coups through economic sanctions, boycotts, and threats of military pressure. For example, years of sanctions on al-Bashir imposed during the 2003-2005 Darfur genocide were maintained even after the killings. The lack of economic activity frustrated civilians and made a heavy contribution to the protests, which ultimately resulted in al-Bashir’s resignation in 2018. 

However, with the growth of significant political instability since 2020, resulting in conflicts across the world, neither the West nor other powerful nations, such as China, have paid attention to these conflicts. In fact, nations such as the UAE, Qatar, and Iran have also been accused of funding certain sides of the war in Sudan. Thus, this lack of attention or even support for certain military regimes has emboldened the armed forces to seize and maintain power with little consequence. 

As Madagascar navigates its transitional period, it must remain wary of slipping into this phenomenon. There are early signs of this occurring, with coup leader and now-President Michael Randrianirina announcing an 18-24 month transition instead of following the constitutional requirement of holding an election 60 days after the emergence of a presidential vacancy. While Randrianirina has appointed 25 civilians to his 29-member transitional cabinet, he has appointed a former business aide to Rajoelina, Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo, as Prime Minister. Although Randrianirina claimed that it was done because Rajaonarivelo’s relatively prominent international profile could convince other governments to aid Madagascar, the inclusion of a member from the previous government shows that some of the protesters’ concerns might be left unaddressed even as the government remains in power for years on end. This might increase civilian grievances and make even this military government vulnerable to other forcible takeovers, even as it tries to maintain power. 

Nevertheless, the Madagascar coup is proof that this phenomenon of forcible military takeovers is here to stay and that militaries across the continent are unwilling to give up power. To this end, it is important that regional organizations and their partners across the globe hold these regimes to account and ensure a quick transition to civilian government. Multilateral organizations such as the G20 and the UN should create a framework for coups and military-led governments. This should include broad measures for transition timelines and composition. All countries should commit to collective punitive actions if these militaries do not respect these measures or use extrajudicial measures to enact constitutional revisions that allow the armed forces to extend or expand their power. Even in these fractured times, we believe that countries respect political stability and legitimate governments, and this can only occur if the drifting coup phenomenon is slowed down. If regional organizations and their partner countries enact such measures, militaries will think twice before launching coups, or at least will ensure an inclusive and quick transition.

Edited By: Connor Hartigan