Over the past year, cargo planes have flooded dusty airstrips in eastern Libya, territory controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces under General Khalifa Haftar. Under the dark of night, these aircraft offload large crates containing weapons and fuel into unmarked trucks that quietly drive south, toward western Sudan and the Rapid Support Forces (R.S.F.), a paramilitary force that controls a significant portion of Sudan. More than just one of many similar smuggling routes, the journey these vehicles represent is a microcosm of the unfolding Saudi-Emirati rupture, and tells the story of how the Haftar family has learned to take advantage of this new Gulf cold war.
Since 2014, Khalifa Haftar and his family have fortified themselves in Eastern Libya, slowly extending their influence over much of Libya’s barren interior. On Libya’s western front, the Government of National Unity (G.N.U.), which is the internationally recognized Libyan state, operates out of Tripoli and is currently run by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. Yet the G.N.U. is relatively weaker than East Libya, and relies on local militias to maintain control. Combined, the positionality of these two loci of power encapsulates Libya’s frozen conflict.
This divide has placed Libya under a new spotlight, as the United Arab Emirates is, according to investigative reporting and recent intelligence assessments, responsible for sending military assets across Haftar’s territory. Consequently, this new trans-Saharan corridor has become a key transportation route for the R.S.F. The revelation of this development has not only bothered Western diplomats but also irritates Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of whom are urging Haftar to stop allowing East Libya to be the bridge between Emirati supplies and Sudan’s insurgent militia. Some have even suggested that this development could send Libya back into full-scale conflict. However, these frictions actually highlight a different reality: Libya’s rivaling authorities benefit from coordinating covertly in shared corruption.
A Gulf Rupture Meets an Unspoken Libyan Equilibrium
To understand how this is the case, it’s important to see how these three outside powers, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.A.E., have engaged with Eastern Libya. When the Haftar family first came into power in 2014, Saudi Arabia sought to stabilize Libya by promoting de-escalation between Libyan factions. Egypt, too, sought to stabilize the region, especially given its nearly 700-mile border with Libya.
Up until recently, Abu Dhabi’s policy towards Eastern Libya ran parallel to Riyadh and Cairo. Recently, however, as Iran’s attention has shifted from regional influence to regime survival, the U.A.E. has capitalized on this political vacuum by strengthening ties with a group of regional clients that seek to change the status quo in the Middle East and North Africa. Put another way, the dramatic uptick in Emirati arms shipments threatens the national interests of Riyadh and Cairo as it relates to security and status.
Despite all of this, none of these three foreign actors are seeking to reignite the Libyan war. While the G.N.U. remains concerned about the opening of this informal supply route, both factions of Libya are much more intertwined with each other than many may expect. Specifically, since 2020 both of these groups have settled into a mutually beneficial standoff with the boundary lines remaining largely unchanged. In essence, the elites within the L.A.N. and G.N.U. quietly coordinate the oil production, budget allocations, and cooperate within the underground commerce networks that prevent the Libyan economy from total collapse. Despite all the surface-level dysfunction, this unspoken equilibrium gives both groups a certain degree of political and fiscal stability.
The most prominent example of how this equilibrium functions can be seen through Libya’s oil sector. Both the Haftar and Dbiebeh families recognize that oil production under the National Oil Corporation (N.O.C.) acts as a lifeline for Libya. Whenever an export terminal is shut down or a major field is disrupted, both sides lose. From salaries going unpaid, subsidies failing, and foreign partners investing elsewhere, the consequences for these obstructions are grave.
A 2026 oil deal with US and French energy companies valued at $20 billion underlines this reality. For this deal to be realized, Haftar’s security forces and the G.N.U.-affiliated Libyan Coast Guard must ensure that critical energy infrastructure is protected. A full-scale war, while anticipated by some analysts, ignores this dense web of shared interest between both factions.
Friction with Rupture
All of this isn’t to infer that the Saudi-Emirati split won’t have ramifications in Libya. Conversely, Haftar’s role as a spoiler for Emirati supplies may grant the octogenarian warlord a decisive bargaining chip. As Egyptian and Saudi officials summon Khalifa’s son and expected successor, Saddam Haftar, to Cairo, they reportedly have offered Haftar’s regime incentives ranging from military training programs to financial packages in return for the closure of these smuggling routes.
Thus the most likely outcome from this new rivalry will not be a total realignment within Libya, but calculated hedging. The Haftar family will attempt to reassure Egypt and Saudi Arabia that the scope of U.A.E. activities in East Libya is limited and managed. Meanwhile, the U.A.E. will likely adjust its shipment times and routes to maximize its strategic presence. In this manner, both sides of the Libyan crisis will continue to govern and reap the benefits of the Gulf’s commotion. Instead of breaking the fragile coexistence between Libya’s east and west, this Saudi-Emirati rupture will increase Haftar’s leverage over these affluent states.
Edited by: Connor Hartigan