Introduction: Painting Before Detailing
Xi Jinping’s 2013 rise to the Chinese presidency marked a turning point in the country’s history, one defined by China’s changing perception of its role in the world. Central to the new, globally ambitious China was its attention to the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In a 2018 speech, Xi contrasted the preliminary, sweeping BRI against a new, more targeted approach using the analogy of traditional Chinese painting. The Initiative’s first five years were likened unto 大写意 (dàxiěyì), a broad-stroke approach aimed at laying down rough structure and general shapes. The new BRI strategy, Xi asserted, would be more comparable to 工笔画 (gōngbǐhuà), emphasizing the delicate, precise, and detailed strokes that finalize a beautiful painting.
While many pundits have framed the strategic adjustment of the BRI as retreat in the face of opposition, a closer look at long-held precedent within Chinese strategy reveals a more far-sighted perspective. For decades, the policy approach of the Chinese Communist Party has emphasized “feeling the stones to cross the river” (mòzhe shítóu guòhé), focusing on tentative establishment of policy with room to adjust as needed. The strategic shift of the BRI is a manifestation of this approach—rather than being surprised by global opposition, Beijing expected it, and was ready to adjust accordingly.
As summarized by Xi, the initial approach of the BRI was focused on the broad strokes of maximizing global exposure as China stepped into the international limelight. After this was achieved, Beijing could shift its focus to the finer details of the BRI painting—converting exposure into global legitimacy. The claim here is not one of omniscience, but rather that China was (characteristically) far-sighted in its approach; that the shift of the BRI is a manifestation of a strategic culture that anticipates the necessity of adjustment over the course of policy implementation.
大写意: Exposure Strategy
As it was originally announced and implemented, the Belt and Road Initiative was described by the Council on Foreign Relations as “one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived.” Since the BRI’s inception, China has spent over $1 trillion on over 13,000 projects across nearly 150 countries. Ambiguity in financing practices and politics, combined with immense capital, has allowed China to complete infrastructure projects nearly four times as fast as Western equivalents. Evidently, China’s initial priorities of BRI projects were scale, speed, and exposure.
However, the unmatched efficiency of the BRI came at a cost. In order to roll out development aid on such a massive scale, China had to tolerate a variety of obstacles, including international pushback, sustainability issues, and domestic problems. While these hurdles inhibited the progress of the BRI to an extent, China was willing to incur international costs in the interest of expanding its prevalence throughout the world. Despite its flaws, the BRI has changed Beijing’s status from peer to leader in the Global South.
Importantly, the imperfection of the early BRI was not accidental; it was the calculated cost of exposure at scale. The goal of increasing exposure was fulfilled, and also demonstrated the acuity of “feeling the stones to cross the river,” opening the door to recalibration in light of limitations. Having established the world’s most expansive infrastructure aid network, Beijing could convert the BRI’s pervasiveness into persuasiveness, shifting to a more targeted, legitimate strategy.
工笔画: Legitimacy Conversion
The BRI’s 2018 shift from broad strokes to fine detailing is best understood as a transition from being seen to being embedded through legitimacy. Strategically, gōngbǐhuà is an apt analogy for the priorities of the new BRI, with its focus on precision, deliberation, and layering over time. Increased emphasis on the Digital and Health Silk Roads formed the center of more precise planning, and deliberate efforts included program restructuring within individual host countries. These combined with domestic adjustments to allow for long-term, consistent modulation. This integrated approach enabled the conversion of unprecedented international attention into increasingly favorable sentiment.
Beijing’s readjustment of financing practices partially alleviated concerns about credit and capital. This also served to address accusations from the West of China’s use of “debt-trap diplomacy,” as new bilateral economic agreements fortified the BRI’s defensibility against Western criticism. The primary audience of the priority shift, though, was the BRI’s 148 host countries, only two of which ultimately parted ways with the Initiative. While the targeted strategic shift wasn’t a miraculous fix-all, it certainly served to increase the long-term durability of the BRI.
Strategic Implications
The adjustment of the BRI carries important implications for the changing aspirations of Chinese foreign policy. These are many, but two are more important than the rest, one practical and the other more abstract: state capacity export and temporal shift.
Speaking first to the export of state capacity, the new BRI programs allow China to move its state capacity overseas. This is manifest in the administrative systems native to BRI projects, as well as the technical and regulatory standards to which the projects are held. While the movement of capital is often the primary concern of economic policy, state capacity export is often more durable—it is less visible, more endogenous, and therefore more difficult to reverse. A repurposing or overhaul of a port or other project established by the BRI is complex and resource-intensive, as its establishment and internal operations occur under Chinese administration. Essentially, China is not only establishing and increasing trade capability and political interconnection; it is doing so in a deeply entrenched and robust fashion.
More abstractly, the shifting priorities of the BRI reflect an extension of the timeframe for China’s policy considerations. Decades of relative political stability in Beijing have long allowed Chinese leadership to take a farsighted approach to policy. However, Xi’s rise to power marked a critical shift in China’s strategic approach, and the deeply consequential nature of his initial years in power compressed the policy timeframe. As the agenda of the new BRI began to take shape, though, shifting to a more targeted approach extended time once more. For years, Xi has emphasized that today’s world is experiencing “great changes not seen in a century” (bǎinián wèiyǒu zhī dà biànjú). The shift of the BRI reflects Xi’s intent for China to remain a strong, steady, legitimate power over the long term in the face of these changes.
Conclusion: The Second Stroke Matters More Than the First
The broad strokes and massive scale of the initial BRI laid the foundation for later precision and nuance, converting initial exposure to international legitimacy. An observation of this policy shift provides important insights for assessing Chinese power. Where the West looks for bold moves and hard results, Beijing leaves space for learning over the long term. Where the West thinks in days, Beijing thinks in decades. An eye for the intangible sees past capital and commitments, which, though important, fail to account for the long-term strategic moves that lie beneath the surface. In assessing the efficacy of Chinese policy and its implications for the world, it is important to understand the paradigm under which Beijing operates.
Edited by: Caleb Washington