Do you believe there were any surprises from this meeting, or did discussions proceed as expected? Apart from the two presidents, would you name another official from each government that you believe will be key to making progress in US-China relations going forward?

Dean Zhu Feng: The San Francisco summit meeting proceedings did not surprise me, ultimately. But, as a whole, the summit meeting was positive and productive, as President Biden deemed it afterward in his press conference. A couple of agreements made by the top leaders should be constructive to the unfolding of our bilateral relationship.

The first is the resumption of mil-to-mil contact and dialogue. Both defense ministers should soon be meeting and revamping talks. This will definitely boost crisis-alleviating dialogue and confidence-building measures.

Given the frequency of both mid-air and at-sea encounters between their military planes and vessels, the resumption of mil-to-mil ties will not only target crisis-management, but will also bring both militaries back to ground level to seriously deliberate on de-escalating risk-taking behaviors and even upon protocols for evading a crisis if an accidental collision, tragically, were to happen. There is no doubt that intensification of mil-to-mil contact will further reduce misperception and misjudgment. It is both desirable and indispensable that Beijing and Washington manage relations  and maintain communication – even in the case of an accidental exchange of fire – to avoid sparking a terrible escalation of military tensions.

Another positive outcome Xi and Biden reached is a mutual interest in holding AI-targeted dialogue. The AI era has already arrived. But no one knows what exactly will happen when AI technology is applied  to military use and how the field of combat will be altered. Furthermore, how will  comprehensive AI applications be utilized by humans without, inevitably, burying the normalcy of human life; in other words,  what measures can be taken to ensure Al technology will never dominate human beings’ way of life?

All such worries will need to be addressed, and the whole of society is truly divided on how to cope with AI challenges. Without U.S. and China cooperation and coordination, in particular, there is little chance the international community would build up a consensus to adopt standards for international governance on AI employment and AI-derived risks alleviation. Most importantly, both Washington and Beijing should carry out their responsibility as great powers to work through barricades to constructive AI development, rather than falling badly and irresponsibly into an AI-driven military arms race. 

The final positive outcome is that Xi and Biden have agreed to resume cooperation between the two governments on fentanyl export and usage. This means that what had been a 7-year-long anti-drug cooperation can now be restored, and American concerns over Chinese fentanyl exports to the U.S. can be well-addressed through US-China joint anti-drug measures.

Putting these agreements together, I have to say that US-China relations should be returning back to a stable track. Though it is unlikely that one structural barrier to improved relations– the US’s designation of China as its “biggest strategic competitor” and intentional restraining of bilateral ties – will be withdrawn by the US in the immediate future, a mostly stable relationship between Washington and Beijing remains possible and plausible for both countries if they are willing to de-escalate tensions and avoid full-front confrontation.

Dean James Steinberg: On the latter,  they’re just in different buckets. On the economic issues, it’s largely Secretary Yellen and Secretary Raimondo who have the lead in this engagement. But on issues like the South China Sea, it’s going to be Secretary Blinken and National Security Advisor Sullivan. So each of them is in their own lane. And, on fentanyl, it’ll presumably be the secretary of HHS and the FDA, and maybe the DHS and people who work on that issue in the DEA. 

I think there were no substantively big surprises. The one thing that was slightly a surprise, on the positive side, was President Biden’s observation that he thought this was the most constructive meeting he had held with President Xi. That’s saying something. 

You can critique, like the New York Times did today, and say there weren’t any great agreements. Both sides were being very cautious about not overpromising. If they can make progress on fentanyl, that will be a good thing. And restoring the mil-to mil to dialogue is a good thing. But I do think that, with President Biden, those were fairly positive words that he used to characterize the meeting, given they already had a pretty good meeting in Bali. That’s important – you can overstate the relationship between the leaders, yes, but it’s not trivial. And if Biden feels that there was some serious engagement here, then that’s a plus.

(Follow-up) You spoke a bit about Secretary Yellen. And I know in the past, Liu He was considered one of those olive branch bearers from Beijing. Do you think there is still one of those in Beijing?

I think we slightly tend to overestimate these kinds of things. We like to pick our favorite interlocutors, whether it’s Zhu Rongji, the late Li Keqiang and so on. But in the end, there are no large differences among the leadership of China. This is not where you have different voices. 

So it is in the United States—I mean, obviously, the system is very different here, whereas China is autocratic—but within the administration, it’s not like Secretary Blinken has his own view; or, maybe administration officials do personally, but when they interact with foreigners, they are representing President Biden. And the only voice that matters is President Biden’s, not Secretary Blinken or Secretary Yellen’s.

Officials will have their views in internal deliberations. Likewise, I have no idea what goes on in Zhongnanhai, and I don’t think many of us do. But one thing that I have heard from talking to the friends in Treasury is that these meetings that (Secretary Yellen) has had with her counterpart (Vice Premier He Lifeng) have been very valuable, because he hasn’t had that much engagement with Americans before, as compared with Liu who, right, had a lot of engagement with Americans. 

So, I believe Treasury officials feel that this extended series of meetings they had a few weeks ago and are having again now is helping to build a better understanding on both sides regarding the perspectives of the other side.

Judging by how each government described the four hours of talks between Presidents Biden and Xi yesterday, there are four major agreements that emerged: first, to resume military-to-military communications; secondly, to establish a counternarcotics working group, focused especially on combating fentanyl production; thirdly, to establish an intergovernmental dialogue on AI; finally, to increase the number of flights and people-to-people exchanges between the US and China. Which of these areas of cooperation or communication do you believe will bear forth the most positive effects on US-China relations going forward? Conversely, did you notice any omissions, disagreements, or anything else from their meeting that you find particularly concerning?  

Dean Zhu: Over the short and medium run, the four agreements you just highlighted will prove to bear forth equally positive effects on US – China relations. As I just mentioned, the resumption of mil-to-mil contact and dialogue will turn out to be the most significant measure taken to keep bilateral ties from perilous risk-taking and lingering tensions. 

However, at the same time, AI dialogue, if it proves to be productive and to help both countries jointly push for global governance of AI, will measurably increase shared responsibilities and visions between the US and China for keeping the world safer rather than more vulnerable and fragile. Any progress in this regard, hopefully, will provide new political enthusiasm for Washington and Beijing to work together.

 People-to-people relations are key, fundamental, and must be reinforced. Otherwise, alienation and estrangement will continuously flare up rancor among people. As for anti-drug and fentanyl coordination and cooperation, I totally believe that it would push more governmental agencies from both countries back to reengagement. It would also help diffuse contentions, first, and beef  up their acquaintance and sustainable cooperation, second. Therefore, I don’t want to list the four agreements in order of importance. I am convinced that all of them are organically inter-connected, and  none of them can be neglected.  

Dean Steinberg: 

I’m very enthusiastic about the latter. We definitely need more flights.

(Follow-up) Yes, I personally want those prices to go down before I go back next year.

I’d like a non-stop flight from Washington to Beijing. 

(Follow-up) Which of these areas do you believe will  bear forth the most positive or the most significant effects on US-China relations going forward? Did you notice any omissions or disagreements? 

Well, we don’t know what we don’t know. I think we have to be careful. They read out what they read out and they don’t read out what they don’t read out. I haven’t talked to anybody who was in the room yet, so I don’t know more than that. 

My experience is that, although there are not specific things that come out of the mil-to-mil talks, that, historically, they’ve been very valuable in ensuring each side retains an opportunity for communication with each other. And, when I talk to former military officials who’ve been involved in those talks – and I know quite a number of them – they have always felt that they’re actually of considerable value. Not that they’re going to reach agreements, but there is a better understanding of each other and a better chance of communication. I’ve heard that from both chiefs and from commanders of Indo-Pacific Command, that these are really valuable things. So I do think it’s important that that goes through.

On fentanyl, this was just an incredible irritation: it was very hard for Americans to understand why China was basically turning a blind eye to this tremendous problem that we have here and that, whatever the legitimate commercial value of these precursors, that China can’t possibly – there’s no ideological or geo-strategic value in not cooperating on this. 

So these talks have taken away something that was both troublesome to Americans and inexplicable, as to why we couldn’t make progress. Showing that at least we can do the easy things together is an important thing to do. I do believe that we ought to be able to at least start to show we can do some of the easier things, even if we can’t solve some of the harder things. 

Lastly, what impact do you believe that this presidential meeting will have on each country’s domestic politics, including public opinion? 

Dean Zhu: If the San Francisco summit between the US and China is followed up with concrete actions to put agreements into practice, I am convinced that its effects will push the bilateral relationship continuously in the right direction, helping add new momentum into the world’s most important and complicated state-to-state relationship.

Perceptively and strategically, according to the Biden administration’s national security strategic reports, China has been regarded precisely as the only power in the 21st century with the intention and capability to challenge US global dominance. Thus, the US has actually regarded Beijing as its biggest adversary. Chinese President Xi unambiguously recommended President Biden to take China as partner, not as adversary. Unfortunately, Xi’s sincere but naturally wishful thinking will not bear fruit in the years to come, given US strategic culture.

As the world heads toward the middle of the 21st century, any formal declaration of a new Cold War will contribute nothing to the welfare of global people. Hopefully the San Francisco summit meeting will mark the inauguration of perpetually stable, constructive and manageable relations between Washington and Beijing, with their nature – neither partner nor adversary alone – being, rather, a securely structured combination of partnership and adversarial elements. Partnership, moreover, ought to intelligently and strategically precede the latter. It will of course be a long journey to reach that point, but it is worthy of our aspirations.  

Dean Steinberg: It’s complicated here because we are going into an election year, and many of the Republican candidates have taken a very tough line on China. We’ve heard from some – not candidates, but actual members of Congress – who even question the value of having meetings at all. For people who have that point of view, this is just going to deepen their opposition and strengthen their critique of the media. 

But if you look at public opinion polling in the United States, on the question of China, the broader proportion of the public, I think, will receive this summit positively. There’s a lot of skepticism towards China since attitudes are the worst that they’ve been since Tiananmen. I also think, however, that people don’t want a confrontation. And they certainly don’t want a war. So I think that this will be seen by a significant number of Americans as a positive, just to reduce the level of tension and the level of risk. 

I also believe that people finally going back to spend some time in China will be welcomed there. China has been inculcated in recent years in this rhetoric that sees America as being the barrier to China’s success, but the very strong indications that we’ve seen lately, not just from President Xi, but also from the People’s Daily, are portraying a much more positive view of the United States and a more optimistic view about the relationship, I think we’ll be welcomed in China because the people in China also have that optimism, for a variety of reasons. 

On the whole, I think it’ll be more contentious in the US than China, but there will be a lot of Americans, even the ones who are very skeptical about China, who still think it’s a good thing that the two sides are talking to each other.

A long time ago I wrote a book about presidential campaigns and transitions with soon-to-be Deputy Secretary (Kurt) Campbell, as you may know. And we pointed out in that book that almost every year China is a contentious issue in the US election. This year will be no different. And I am quite certain that whoever the Republican candidate is will accuse President Biden of being soft on China. 

But I have to say that that’s been true in almost every election. You go back to President Reagan accusing President Carter of being soft on China, candidate Clinton accusing President Bush of being soft on China, and President Bush accusing…I mean, it’s a recurring theme. You don’t get points in American elections by being nice to China. 

Yet, I don’t think the election itself is going to harm US-China relations. The outcome of the election may have an impact, depending on who wins the election. 

This concludes Part III of our bidirectional interview with Dean Zhu Feng and Dean Steinberg. We warmly appreciate their time and willingness to share their opinions.

Look for our next interview of this kind to be published in 2024 – and please reach out to us if you have a topic in mind that we ought to cover or an expert we ought to interview!