By: Percy Yixuanchen Yu

Edited by: Chad Higgenbottom and Rui Cheng

A new perspective on Taiwan’s role and status in the context of the U.S.-China relationship, including Taiwan’s own sense of identity and sovereignty and the geopolitical dynamics of the region.

在美中关系背景下思考台湾角色和地位的新视角，包括台湾自身的认同感和主权，以及该地区的地缘政治动态。

Rethinking of the core conflict in Sino-US relations

重新思考中美的核心冲突

With so much having been written over the past several days on the much-anticipated summit between the leaders of China and the U.S. last week, it’s worth taking a moment to calmly step back from predicting how these two major powers may or may not begin cooperating more frequently. Instead, let us focus on the extremely difficult point of contention between China and the U.S. — the Taiwan issue. This involves exploring the topic  from a less appreciated angle: the overlooked subjectivity of Taiwan, including its political advantages, conditions, and dynamic changes within Taiwanese democracy. The future direction of a democratic Taiwan depends not only on hard power competition between China and the U.S. but also, and perhaps more so, on Taiwan’s own decisions.

当更多有关备受期待的中美元首峰会的报告在过去一周出炉的当下，我们不妨冷静下来，既从中美之间复杂而又全面联动的大国双边关系在议题层面争夺的细节稍微抽身，又紧紧围绕中美之间存在的极其难以解决的利益争夺的交汇点——台湾问题，来探讨一下少有人换一个角度看待和开启大讨论的问题，被忽视的台湾主体性，它的优势，它的条件，以及它的动态变化。民主台湾何去何从不仅取决于中美之间的硬实力竞争，更取决于台湾自身的决定。

From the perspective of traditional strategic security studies, it is improbable  that Taiwan could possess complete subjectivity, including autonomy in strategic choices. In other words, many question Taiwan’s ability to make decisions that substantially shape the island’s future, regardless of decisions made by Mainland China or any other intervening state. This is due to the nearly irreconcilable differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait on the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty, as well as the ever-widening gulf in content and tone between each side’s sources of information. 

从传统战略安全学的角度思考，台湾地区不可能拥有包括战略选择自主在内的充分和完整的主体性。换言之，许多人质疑台湾拥有不顾大陆以及其他干预国而实质性塑造该岛未来的能力。这是由于两岸对于台湾主权问题不可调和的矛盾以及两岸间日益扩大的信息鸿沟。

It is difficult for Taiwan to maintain a dynamic balance between China and the United States. Therefore, even though mainstream political parties in Taiwan uniformly emphasize close relations with the U.S., every election is still fraught with debates over a rigid choice between China and the U.S. The Kuomintang, having the longest history of interactions with the U.S., is still labeled as a pro-Communist external political camp. This binary political ecology accelerates ideological polarization in Taiwan, making external perceptions of Taiwan’s subjectivity somewhat ambiguous. More importantly, Taiwanese media’s lack of confidence in the island’s  subjectivity actually reinforces each outlet’s prerogative to shape the ideology of the political camp it supports at the macro level. Hence, research and discussion on the increasingly strong subjectivity of Taiwan are still rare to see.

台湾地区很难在美中之间保持动态平衡。因此，即使台湾地区主流政党无一例外地强调和美国的紧密关系，每次大选仍然充斥着选择中国还是美国的刚性路线的争论。国民党作为在台湾和美国拥有最长交往史的政党，仍然被贴上亲共的政治标签。这种二元化分的政治生态加速了台湾地区的意识形态上的极化倾向，一定程度上使得外界对于台湾主体性的认知处于模糊的状态。更重要的是，台湾地区的媒体对于台湾主体性的高度不自信实际上加强了每个媒体机构在宏观层面上去塑造其所支持政党意识形态的必要性，因此对于台湾地区不断增强的主体性的研究和论述还不够完整。

Subjectivity – the key to resolving the Cross-Strait conflict?

主体性：解决两岸冲突的关键？

When we emphasize subjectivity, we often focus on the cross-analysis of hard and soft power of a sovereign state. The theoretical basis for the subjectivity of an entity like Taiwan, which is not widely recognized but substantially exists, is still rather thin. However, due toTaiwan’s unique political circumstances, both the factors that expand and the factors that limit its subjectivity coexist. Taiwan’s lack of widespread recognition as a sovereign state undoubtedly has a long-term negative impact on the survival of the Republic of China and actually accelerates the Taiwanese independence movement’s popularity in Taiwan. 

当我们强调主体性，往往着眼于一个主权国家的硬实力和软实力层面的交叉分析。对于台湾这样一个非广泛承认但又实质存在的大型政治实体而言，主体性的理论基础还比较薄弱。但是，正因为台湾自身条件的特殊性，其对于台湾的主体性既存在消极影响也存在积极影响。毫无疑问，台湾没有得到主权国家的广泛承认对于中华民国的存续具有非常长远的负面影响，并实质上加速了台湾独立进程在台湾地区的民意集聚。

However, Taiwan’s long-term maintenance of a political system drastically different from mainland China objectively strengthens its political connection with the international democratic alliance, shaping Taiwan’s role as a tragic yet unignorable front line of democracy in the East. The nearly eight years of Dr. Tsai Ing-wen’s administration have been crucial in shaping this image as Taiwan’s subjectivity positioning, while a more assertive politics in mainland China and the political turmoil in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have objectively helped the ruling Democratic Progressive Party to effortlessly promote this image. 

但是台湾长期保持和中国大陆地区截然不同的政治制度又客观上增强了台湾与民主联盟之间的政治联结，形塑出台湾在民主阵营东方前线的悲壮而又不可忽视的角色。蔡英文执政的八年就是将这样的形象全面形塑为台湾的主体性定位的重要时间段，而大陆地区政治风格上的变化和发生在香港特别行政区的政治纷扰客观上帮助了执政的民进党几乎不费吹灰之力地完成并巩固了这种战略定位。

It is fair to indicate that branding the island as a democratic frontier is risky but also very tempting for Taiwan’s political parties. The reason is simple: it is beneficial for shaping and visualizing the enhancement of Taiwan’s subjectivity, which even the Taiwanese themselves lack confidence in. In other words, when the subjectivity of a politically weaker entity becomes more visible, it objectively is strengthened.

毋庸置疑，这种民主前沿阵地的定位是危险的，但对于台湾的政党而言却也是十分诱人的。原因很简单，这样的定位调整，有利于增强并具体化台湾人自己都很没有自信的台湾主体性。或者说，对于一个绝对实力处于相对弱势的政治实体而言，当这个地区的主体性愈发能够被感知时，它的主体性也客观上被增强了。 

An interesting question arises: when we see Taiwan taking diplomatic actions that tie its fate with the democratic camp, do we perceive Taiwan’s subjectivity as being enhanced or weakened?

这里不得不提到一个有趣的问题，当我们看到台湾地区加强了其和民主阵营命运休戚与共的外交动作时，我们也同时认知到当台湾地区与民主阵营捆绑越紧密时，那么台湾的主体性是增强了还是削弱了呢？

If you are from mainland China or its allied regions, you are more likely to deem this a loss of subjectivity and a kind of diplomatic suicide. From this perspective, no government should enhance the visibility  of a certain camp, as it risks ruining the common interests of the citizenry as a whole. Taiwan has almost no strategic subjectivity when it practices this behavior, from Beijing’s point of view. 

如果你是来自中国大陆地区或其伙伴区域，这无疑是丧失主体性的一种外交自杀行为。因为从这个角度出发，没有任何一个政治实体乐于增强其某一阵营前线的认知，这对于国民而言太过于冒险了。这种行为证明了台湾地区几乎没有什么战略主体性可言。

However, the narrative changes completely in other regions. This has substantial benefits for Taiwan’s subjectivity, as when Taiwan strengthens its connections with democratic countries, it not only appears more like a typical country but also successfully differentiates the concept of cultural China into two objective realities. Precisely because mainland China considers the Republic of China to have ceased to exist, Taiwan’s subjectivity cannot be considered solely from the perspective of state sovereignty. Although this is not what mainland China wants to see, the enhancement of Taiwan’s subjectivity arises especially when Taiwan maintains a clear cultural contrast with the mainland, not a grant of power by the U.S. and its allies.

但对于其它区域而言，叙述就会完全改变，这对于台湾地区的主体性有实质的助益，因为当台湾加强和民主国家的联结的时候，台湾不仅表现得更像一个普通国家，还成功缔造了文化中国的概念也可以有两个版本的客观事实。恰恰是因为中国大陆地区认为中华民国已经消失，所以台湾的主体性也就不能单纯从国家主权这一角度考虑。这虽然是中国大陆地区不愿意看到的，但台湾的主体性的增强是和大陆对比而来的，而不是被美国及其盟友赋予的。

This also, to a certain extent, illustrates a long-standing controversial issue – that the Kuomintang, despite having the longest history of interactions with the United States, is always considered a potential weak point in maintaining Taiwan’s democratic system. This directly led to the Kuomintang’s unexpectedly poor performance in the elections following their significant victories in the 2018 and 2022 midterm elections, as the people of Taiwan doubted the Kuomintang’s ability to maintain a dynamic balance between China and the United States. 

这同样一定程度上说明了一个长久以来颇具争议的问题，即为何拥有最长久和美国交往历史的国民党却总被认为是台湾维持民主制度的一个可能的破口，这直接导致了国民党在紧随2018和2022两次中期选举大胜后非常不如预期的大选表现，因为台湾人民怀疑国民党维持中美动态平衡的能力。

The people of Taiwan do not doubt the Kuomintang’s historical experience and substantial political foundation in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait, given the Kuomintang and the Communist Party together established  the 1992 Consensus. However, when deeming the party a “non-democratic force,” the Democratic Progressive Party is not accusing the Kuomintang of the intent to turn Taiwan undemocratic once they govern. Instead, their argument is that if the Kuomintang governs, non-democratic forces might enter Taiwan. 

台湾人民不怀疑国民党维持两岸和平的历史经验和现实政治基础，因为国民党和共产党有关于92共识的完整论述。但是，当国民党被污蔑为非民主力量时，民主进步党并不是在指责国民党执政了，台湾就会变得不民主了，而是国民党执政的话，那么非民主的力量就可能进到台湾了。

This narrative is not only widely accepted by Taiwanese people but also faces little opposition from public opinion in the Western democratic camp. In other words, the 1992 Consensus between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party can resolve some of the sovereignty disputes between the two sides of the Strait. It uses a political consensus  – in the absence of true consensus –  to break the deadlock of political confrontation, allowing for two distinct paths of economic development and social integration with shared political guarantees. However, with rising urgency towards reunification in the mainland and the huge backlash of public opinion against the practice of ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong, the 1992 Consensus has become the biggest factor preventing the Kuomintang from appealing to centrist and young voters.

而这个论述，不仅仅是台湾地区的人民普遍买单，西方民主阵营的公共舆论也少有异议。换句话说，国民党和共产党的92共识能够解决两岸之间的部分主权争议，用没有共识的一个政治共识去打破政治对垒的僵局，形成政治保障下的经济和社会融合的双轨发展，但是随着大陆政治风格的变化以及香港在一国两制制度实践中引发的巨大民意反弹，92共识已成为国民党无法获得中间选民和年轻选民支持的最大因素。

Tracing Taiwan’s Political History and Implications

回顾台湾政治制度发展的历史与启示

Nonetheless, the mere strengthening of ties between Taiwan and democratic countries only provides the foundation for Taiwan to enhance its own subjectivity, rather than guaranteed results. Taiwan’s ability to control its own destiny still depends on whether it can contribute institutional-level innovations  to the democratic camp. 

不过，单纯增强的台湾和民主国家的纽带仅仅提供了台湾增强自身主体性的基础，台湾的未来仍然取决于它能否对民主阵营作出贡献，或是能否对民主体制作出制度层面的探索。

What might Taiwan have to offer? Per the Constitution of the Republic of China, Taiwan has a meticulously designed political system that integrates Western democratic institutions with Eastern tendencies towards a centralized government that distributes social resources. Taiwan’s political system was once a dual executive system structure, where the President was responsible for foreign affairs, national defense, and cross-strait affairs, while a wide range of policy matters were decided by the head of the executive department — the Premier. 

台湾能提供什么？台湾，或者说中华民国宪法，是一部融合了西方民主制度和东方倾向于政府权力来分配社会资源的特殊政治体制的细致设计和安排。台湾的政治制度曾经是一个双首长制度的政治结构，总统负责外交，国防和两岸事务，而林林总总的政策事务均由行政部门的首长——行政院长裁决。

This changed in 1997 when Taiwan underwent its fourth constitutional revision. Under the leadership of Dr. Lee Teng-hui, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party cooperated to modify the parliamentary cabinet system,expanding the powers of the President. They adopted the ‘semi-presidential system’ of the French Fifth Republic as the blueprint for this revision, implementing a constitutional system of direct presidential elections, cabinet accountability, abolition of the Premier’s consent right, and conditional exercise of the power to dismiss the cabinet. 

1997年台湾地区进行了第4次修宪，在李登辉博士主导下，国民党和民主进步合作，修改原先宪法中的议会内阁制，为总统个人扩权，并决定採取法国第五共和「半总统制」做为修宪蓝图，实施「总统直选、内阁负责、取消阁揆同意权、有条件行使倒阁权」的宪政体制。

Nevertheless, as Taiwan’s democratic practices continued to deepen, this system was widely criticized because the subsequent constitutional system rapidly became unclear in terms of how powers and responsibilities were delegated. The Premier was no longer seen as the true head of the highest executive body, but rather became an executor for the President, bearing responsibility for the failures of the President’s policies. The original spirit of the responsible cabinet system in the constitution was also undermined as the Premier lost the support and endorsement of the Legislative Yuan’s consent, resulting in the Premier and their governing team lacking legitimacy.

然而，随着台湾民主实践的不断深入，这一套体系被广泛诟病，因为此后的宪政体制迅速变得权责不清。行政院长并不被看作是真正名实相符的最高行政机构的首长，而是变成了总统个人的执行长，并为总统政策的失败而承担责任。原先责任内阁制的宪政精神，也因行政院长失去立法院同意权的支持和背书，使得行政院长本人和其执政团队缺乏民意授权的基础。

This series of issues stemming from the transition from a parliamentary cabinet system to a strong presidential system have made whether to amend the constitution a focal point in the upcoming 2024 Taiwan regional elections. Although the ruling party and opposition parties have not reached consensus on the specific path of reform due to differences in their positions, there is a high consensus on reshaping a democratic system where powers and responsibilities align. This includes restoring the Legislative Yuan’s endorsement of the appointment of the Premier and demanding the President to report periodically to the legislature, thereby implementing the political spirit of being accountable to the legislative body. 

从议会内阁制到总统强势领导下的半总统制的第一次政治体制转型导致一系列问题使得这次2024年台湾地区大选紧紧围绕是否修宪而展开。执政党和在野各党派虽然在具体改革路径上因为自身立场的差异而没有共识，但是对于重塑权责相符的民主体制有高度共识。这包括了恢复立法院对于行政院长任命的背书以及要求总统定期向国会报告，以此落实总统对立法机关负责的政治精神。

In the absence of a specific consensus on constitutional revision among the parties,  a constitutional convention, whereby a representative of the majority party in the legislative body is appointed as the Premier by the President, without going through a constitutional amendment, has gained widespread approval and is very likely to be implemented after 2024. This means that, within the democratic camp, Taiwan will likely be able to boast of its transition from a strong presidential system  to a dual-track system of presidential-parliamentary politics.. This not only represents Taiwan’s continuous innovations in democratic politics, but also finds a potential solution that other countries within the democratic camp could implement to address the uncertainties of a strong presidential system and the inefficiencies of a semi-presidential system. 

在各党没有具体修宪共识的前提下，一个不通过修宪，而由总统任命立法机构多数党派的代表为总理的宪政惯例的方式得到普遍的赞成，并非常有可能在2024年后实施。这意味着从强总统制到总统-议会双轨政治的实践仍然很有可能在台湾上演。这不仅代表了台湾在民主实践上的经验总结和持续探索，也为民主阵营解决强总统制的不确定性和半总统制的低效率找到了一个可能的方案。

The key point of Taiwan’s approach is to ensure that the core powers of the presidency, a position elected directly by all citizens, are fully maintained, while also ensuring that the leader of the majority party in the legislature,having the same term length as the President, can also govern while being backed by indirect public endorsement of the legislature. If successful, Taiwan’s reforms will not only assert its leadership in  technological and economic development but also directly showcase its increasingly mature ability to self-correct politically as the only democratic political system in the Chinese-speaking regions, taking a firm step towards fully and confidently integrating into the democratic camp. This reform itself is profoundly meaningful for Taiwan and, in contrast to other Chinese-majority countries and regions, objectively helps to highlight its subjectivity.

台湾的方案的要点在于，既确保了全民直接选举的代表，总统这一职务的核心权力得到充分维护，又确保了与总统任期完全相同的立法机构的多数党的领袖可以靠着间接民意的背书直接参与国家治理。台湾的尝试如果成功，不仅有利于台湾深化其在重要的世界科技和经济发展中的领先优势，也直接展示了其作为华人地区唯一的民主政治体系的越趋成熟的自我修正能力，向着充分和自信地融入民主阵营迈出坚实的一步。在其他以华人人口为主的国家或地区的对比下，这一改革本身对于台湾作为民主制度下的大中华圈的一个特殊区域的实体存在深具意义，在和其它华人人口为主的国家和地区的对比下，也客观上有利于其主体性的彰显。

The comparative advantage of Taiwan – the ultimate umbrella for the island?

台湾的比较优势：岛内最终的保护伞？

In general, this article hopes to bring to our academic community and friends a new perspective on a contentious issue and to spark some deeper discussions. That is, how do people view the subjectivity of a politically unique and economically highly developed entity like Taiwan?  To be more frank, can it be said that great powers like China and the United States, regardless of when and whether they are friendly to Taiwan or not, are truly pleased to see Taiwan possess such subjectivity? Indeed,  we lack sufficient evidence to show whether a place with such close ties to both the Western democratic camp and to major Eastern powers will be expected by all parties to have the power to choose its own destiny. 

总体而言，这篇文章希望能够带给我们的学术社区和朋友们一个新的观察的角度，并能引发一些更为深入的讨论，即大家如何看待一个像台湾这样地位和条件特殊的经济上高度发达的政治实体的主体性，甚至更坦率的说，像中国和美国这样的世界大国，无论与台湾友好与否，是否真的乐见台湾有这样的主体性。诚然，台北作为现存的中华民国的实体的政治中心是一个有趣的政治城市，但我们同样缺乏证据表明一个同时与西方民主阵营和东方大国有这样紧密联系的地方是否被各方期待拥有选择自身命运的权力。

It is also thought-provoking to consider whether Taiwan’s strengths in economic and technological development, as well as reforms and innovations within its democratic system, will substantially enhance Taiwan’s subjectivity. When we step back from the intense and ongoing struggle between China and the United States over the future political status of Taiwan, and attempt to understand what Taiwanese society thinks of its own progress, we may believe even more strongly that Taiwan could possess a high level of subjectivity. Beyond the inevitable gaming about Taiwan’s future and fate at the China-U.S. summit, what Taiwan decides it desires for itself is the more interesting story 2024 may be another decisive moment for Taiwan – will it also be for the practice of democracy in general??  Let’s continue observing how this story develops. 

同样值得思考的是，台湾在经济和科技发展上取得的领先优势以及台湾在民主制度上的自主探索和改革，是否会对台湾地区的主体性的增强产生实质的有效价值。当我们从中国和美国两个大国对于台湾地区未来政治地位的安排这一问题上的激烈和持续的博弈抽离，花一点时间去真诚地了解台湾岛内对于自身社会进步的一些思考和相关努力，也许，我们对于台湾主体性的信心甚至比世界各国是否允许台湾真正拥有这样的主体性的信心要更大。这，也许就是中美峰会必然关于台湾前途和命运的讨论之外，不一定有决定性意义，但是非常有趣的故事。2024，也许真的是一个对于台湾而言的又一个决定性的时刻，而这次民主的实践会胜利吗，让我们拭目以待。