By: Taru Ahluwalia

Edited By: Leah Li

On August 4, 2024, a contentious amendment to Iraq’s 1959 Personal Status Law (PSL) was formally introduced in the Iraqi parliament. The proposed change, brought forth by independent MP Ra’ad al-Maliki, could legally permit the marriage of girls as young as nine years old. Child marriage in Iraq is already a pervasive societal concern, deeply entrenched due to a blend of cultural norms, economic difficulties, and exploitable gaps within the legal framework. The prevalence of underage marriage in the country is among the highest globally, with 7% of girls marrying by the age of 15. Furthermore, UNICEF reports that 28% of Iraqi girls are married before reaching the current legal age of 18. If enacted, the proposed amendment could have devastating implications for young girls in Iraq, who are already grappling with systemic barriers to their fundamental human rights. 

Adopted in 1959, Iraq’s PSL governs key aspects of family life, including marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Heavily influenced by the Iraqi Women’s League, the 1959 law is regarded as one of the region’s most progressive legal codes. Its progressive nature stems from provisions that significantly limited polygamy by requiring a man to obtain his first wife’s consent before marrying additional wives. Furthermore, it granted women the right to initiate divorce and mandated that all marriages be formalized before a judge within the state court system, with unofficial marriages outside the courts deemed illegal. Articles 7 and 8 of the PSL establish the legal marriage age at 18 for both genders. However, an exception permits marriage as young as 15, provided there is judicial approval and consent from a legal guardian. 

The proposed amendment to Iraq’s Personal Status Law would empower Sunni and Shia religious councils to create their own “codes of Sharia rulings on personal status matters” within six months of the law’s approval. Under this system, Muslim families would have the option to marry under either civil law or religious law, depending on their sect. If enacted, these changes would transfer the authority over family matters almost entirely to religious clerics. Given that Shi’ite Muslims constitute approximately 55-60% of Iraq’s population, activists have expressed serious concerns that this amendment could legalize child marriage for Shi’ite girls as the Ja’fari school permits the marriage of girls as young as nine. The proposed amendments directly violate Iraq’s signed obligations under international treaties of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Families opting for religious law must select between Sunni or Shia legal systems, with the respective codes being drafted within six months of the law’s enactment by dedicated bodies within the Shia and Sunni Endowment Offices. For the Shia framework, disputes would ultimately defer to the most-followed cleric in Iraq, currently Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, granting the Shia religious establishment (Marjayya) substantial legal authority within the state. However, this move could face opposition from clerics as Islam lacks a unified family law even within individual sects. Granting such authority to select specific legal interpretations risks creating fragmented and inconsistent legal outcomes. This could also encourage Iraq’s non-Muslim minorities—such as Yezidis, Christians, and others—to seek separate legal systems, exacerbating sectarian divisions in a country still recovering from the sectarian violence of 2005–2008 and 2014–2017. By institutionalizing religious differences, this amendment risks entrenching societal divides after years of conflict.

Granting structural legitimacy to the proposed amendment also risks legalizing “pleasure marriages,” or temporary marital arrangements conducted by religious clerics. These marriages, while culturally regarded as legitimate within some communities, lack legal validity unless they are registered with the Personal Status Court and accompanied by a civil marriage contract. Pleasure marriages allow men to enter into marital relationships with several women for durations ranging from a few hours to several months. Although this practice is currently prohibited by law, it remains widespread in Shia communities. Clerics in prominent Shia religious areas, such as Kadamiya and Najaf, continue to officiate pleasure marriages with impunity. Although Article 240 of the Iraqi Penal Code theoretically provides a mechanism to prosecute individuals who defy orders issued by an official authority, public prosecutors have yet to invoke this provision against offending religious leaders. With the new PSL, the prevalence of pleasure marriages in Iraq could increase significantly, raising concerns about the de facto legalization of practices akin to prostitution, rendering women and girls legally unprotected and highly vulnerable to exploitation. 

This is supplemented by the most troubling and inequitable policy which requires women and girls to present proof of marriage to access vital services, including hospital births, prenatal care, and public welfare programs. Without a marriage certificate, they are barred from giving birth in hospitals, often leaving them no choice but to deliver at home under unsafe conditions. This lack of access to emergency obstetric care significantly heightens the risk of medical complications, endangering both mother and child. With the proposed legal marriage age as low as 9, adolescent pregnancies would further exacerbate these risks due to insufficient medical support during pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum recovery.

In addition to health implications, child marriage can also trap young girls in cycles of dependency and poverty by curtailing their access to education and employment opportunities. In Iraq, a strong link exists between the lack of education and early marriage. Statistics reveal that 46.2% of women who marry before the age of 18 have either no education or only pre-primary schooling. The disruption of education limits their prospects of getting married and lessens the financial burden of their parents. Sarah Sanbar, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, aptly notes, “Girls belong in school and on the playground, not in a wedding dress.” Early marriages expose them to the profound psychological and physical trauma endured by child brides, including unwanted sexual relations, domestic violence, and the life-threatening risks associated with early pregnancies. 

The proposed amendment also threatens to dismantle critical protections currently available to divorced women under PSL. At present, if a husband initiates divorce proceedings, the wife is entitled to remain in the marital home for three years at her husband’s expense, receive two years of spousal maintenance, and be compensated with the current value of her dowry. Under the proposed shift to religious law, many of these safeguards would be eliminated. For instance, Article 57(1) of the PSL prioritizes mothers in child custody and upbringing decisions, provided the parent is over 18 years of age and the arrangement does not harm the child. However, religious marriages often bypass legal age restrictions, leaving underage mothers particularly vulnerable to losing custody of their children, thereby trapping them in abusive or exploitative relationships. Inheritance rights for women would also be curtailed by certain religious laws that diminish their entitlements. Moreover, without a civil marriage contract, women and girls would lack the legal framework to enforce their rights to dowry, spousal maintenance, and inheritance if these claims were denied. This institutionalized discrimination would systemize gender inequalities and exacerbate vulnerabilities for women in Iraq.

Failure to act on rejecting the proposed amendment to PSL would mean generations of Iraqi women continue to be constrained by an oppressive patriarchal legal system. Civil society groups, particularly Iraqi lawyers, Sunni religious leaders, and women’s organizations such as the 188 Alliance, have strongly mobilized against the law, holding protests in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. However, young women, who would be most affected by this change, face the greatest social restrictions on their ability to protest. Female legislators and policymakers continue to pressure parliamentarians who support the law. Before the amendment can be voted on, it must be debated in parliament. Once debated, it can be scheduled for a vote, where a simple majority would result in the amendment passing into law. As of now, no official date for the debate has been set. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, along with other elite clerics, is expected to meet soon with Iraqi civil society organizations after the Arba’een pilgrimage. It is anticipated that the outcome will involve a push to refine the amendment rather than reject it outright. The amendment’s ambiguity not only jeopardizes women’s rights but also poses long-term legal risks of sectarianism, endangering the future of Iraq.